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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Section 1.1: Overview of South Africa's Ports 
The late 1970's witnessed many countries in the developing world shifting away from 
earlier models of development which were built around Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (lSI). These countries were experiencing economic problems which are 
common to the application of lSI policy particularly, high cost domestic production and 
overvalued exchange rates (Rodriguez, 2003). In this regard, many developing 
countries moved increasingly towards export-led growth strategies and trade policies 
which encouraged private sector competitiveness in a global economy - a model laid 
out in the "Washington Consensus". This model comprises a set of broad free market 
economic ideas which advocate macroeconomic stability, free trade, floating exchange 
rates and free markets to help improve economic welfare under uncertain conditions 
(Williamson, 2004). 
In the case of South Africa, also a developing country, similar challenges were 
experienced with the adoption of the lSI policy. Gross Domestic Product (GOP) and 
investment rates were low, exports of goods and services were volatile and at times 
negative and the external capital account had been in deficit since the 1970's 
(Department of Trade and Industry [DTI], 2008). Furthermore, exports were highly 
concentrated around mineral commodities and the tariff regime was indiscriminatingly 
protective of the domestic industry (DTI, 2008). The lSI policy, coupled with the 
sanctions against apartheid resulted in low levels of productivity and high levels of 
unemployment in the South African economy. 
While other developing countries were shifting to export-oriented trade policies, South 
Africa was faced with sanctions against apartheid which impeded its transition to the 
Washington Consensus agenda. It was only after its political transformation in 1994 that 
South Africa embraced a domestic version of the Washington Consensus agenda with 
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy of 1996 reflecting a clear 
statement of this. In terms of trade and industrial strategy, the central thrust of the 
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GEAR policy was to pursue employmenl creating international competitiveness, 
regional econom iC integration and expand market access through preferential trade 
agreements With industrialised countries This process involved moving away from 
demand-side interventions including subsidies and tariffs which raised prices received 
by producers, to supply-side measures which lower unit costs and accelerate the 
progress up the value chain (Department of Finance, 1996, 12). 
Cost effective and competitive ports are vital for an efficient value chain capable of 
competing domestically and globally. One might expect that strong efforts to address 
high prices and cost inefficiencies in South AfrICa's ports would have been part of the 
broader embrace of the GEAR policy. What actual ly took place With respect to port 
institutional and pricing reform has been altogether more ambigUOUS in South Africa and 
thiS dissertation explores these ambiguities 
Here below are three key issues wh ich cha racterise the port system of South Atrica . 
1) South Africa's port waterfront charges are very high 
The graph below shows wateliront charges for selected global ports In 1998. 
Figure 1: Total Waterfront Charges 
Source (Department 01 Transport, t 998 Cited In ChasOtTJ<lriS, 2QOO: 108) 
In a study by the Department of Transport, the international benchmarking of South 
Africa 's ports showed that they are too expensive for their users. As indicated in the 
, 
graph above, in comparison with other Port Authorities, South Africa's port charges as 
exemplified by port of Durban are significantly high while other services and facilities are 
artificially low. Other developing countries represented in the graph are Malaysia (Port 
Klang and Johor), Thailand (Laem Chabang), Hong Kong and Port of Singapore 
(Singapore). The developed countries are: New Zealand, (Auckland and Tauranga), 
Belgium (Zeebrugge), England (Tilbury), Australia (Brisbane and Melbourne) and USA 
(Baltimore, Charleston and Oakland). 
The charges in the graph are port authority charges which consist of light dues, vessel 
traffic service, pilotage, marine services, port charges (port dues and berth dues) and 
cargo dues. In South Africa, cargo dues constitute about 70 per cent of income to the 
port authority (National Economic Development and Labour Council [NEDLAC], 2008: 
2). 
"Cargo dues on all commodities, articles or containers (full or empty) are levied at all 
ports belonging to or controlled and managed by Transnet [South Africa state-owned 
transport conglomerate] this echoes the description of wharfage in previous years" 
(NEDLAC, 2008: 22). Cargo dues are levied in unit form per ton or Twenty-foot 
Equivalent Units (TEUs) for containers (NEDLAC, 2008: 22). 
The other port charges represented in this graph are terminal charges which are cargo 
handling costs while infrastructural costs are represented within the Port Authority 
charges (Chasomeris, 2006: 108). The ancillary charges are other general port fees. 
Not only were port prices high in South Africa, but the tariff structure hugely weighed in 
favour of the export of raw mineral commodities at the expense of the manufacturing 
sector. While the GEAR policy was initiated in 1996, it was not until 2013 that port tariffs 
for the export of manufactured goods were lowered by over 40 per cent. What this 
translates into is that port pricing reform has taken 17 years to align with South Africa's 
industrial strategy. The issue of port pricing will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
2) Significantly high port profits to Transnet 
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Transnet comprised five divisIOns namely, Portnet ' (Ports), Spoornet (rai l), Petronet 
(pipel ines) Autortet (road) arKl South African Airways (Chasomerls, 2006'102), The 
table below shows the contribution of profit to Transnet after finance costs for all the 
companies under Transnet The secorid table il lustrates the same although th is IS after 
the split of Portnet Into National Port Authority and Port Operations. 
Figure 2: Transnet"s Profits from 1993 to 2011 
Source Transnet annual reports for various 
years 
" 
Source: T ran >net annual reports lor varIOus years 
In analYSing Figure 1 and Figure 2, the high pricing of the ports and the profits to 
Transnet respectively, one immediately sees that the principa l issue of South Africa's 
waterfront prices is rent extraction by Transnet. 
3) Port productivity and performance 
'Portnet spolt in to a landlord, the Natlor>.11 Port Authority (NPA) and operations arm, South Africa Port 
Operations (SAPO) in 2002 (Departmoot of Transport 2OO2i 
, 
Figure 3: Productivity verses Terminal Handling Charges (THC) 2012 
Analysis of term inal operator produ clillity VS, THCs charged 
EXilJTl,"e 0/ porN 1I1~~ .. d 011 ~ ifler5k La,s vOYl>;Je 
ProductiVIty IT EUi haul ) 
". 
• PO' ",." " . 
, .. -j"'~ •• 
• • " , .. , .. Tiles (USD, TW) 
Soorce (Transnet National Port Alitho rity [TNPA]. 2012 16) 
The benchmark ing of Terminal Handling Charges (THCs) was conducted by South 
Africa s National Port Authority (NPA) In 2012' THCs were further analysed in relatton 
to container terminal operator productivity in Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) per 
vessel working hour 3 The task was performed using port calls by Maersk Lars' current 
voyage and this shipping line was selected due to its frequency to the port of Durban as 
well as the fact that her voyage includes large and vttal ports in Europe, Asia and the 
Middle East (TNPA, 2012:14) The IX'rts in the graph above are Port Quasim of 
Pakistan, Port Kaohsiung of Taiwan, Port Jebel Ali of the United Arab Emirates, Port 
Yantian of China, Port of Salalah, Oman, Port of TanJung Pelepas of Malaysia, Port of 
Tilbury in Eng land , Port of Rotterdam, Netherlands, Port of Bremerhaven, Germany and 
" Container operations are charged on a Terminal Hsndling Charge (THC) l:Iasis for whICh handlmg costs 
are aggregated to obtall a standard equal ised THe for each type of cCIltainer" (Nationa l Economic 
Development and Labour CounollNEDLAC] , 200817). 
' One way of measurir>g produ cti"~y at port IS throogh measunng the number of containers lifted per hour 
to or from the vessel at the port. The graph therefore shows terml",,1 harld llng cI1arges in reiatiCll to 
productivity at the ports where prool1Ctivity IS measu red In terms of container TEUs per vessel working 
hour 
Durban, South Africa. The graph above shows the port with high productivity having the 
lowest THCs amongst the benchmarked ports. Durban on the other hand, has low 
container terminal productivity and is expensive. 
According to (TNPA, 2012: 15) the common complaints from shipping lines are that of 
the high port costs in South Africa especially when considering cargo handling 
performance and service levels at the ports. One possible remedy for this problem 
would be increased productivity through the introduction of private participation in order 
to lower costs-the global trend-which we will see in the next chapter. South Africa did 
embark on port reform in the late 1990's although, by 2008 the country completely 
backed off from this effort. 
In view of the three characteristics above, the goal of this dissertation is to understand 
the disconnect between the commitment to a globally competitive industrial strategy and 
failure for at least two decades after that, to address the challenges of the ports. This 
dissertation will describe the evolution of the efforts to address low productivity and high 
pricing by looking at how and why Transnet adopted a highly constrained process of 
port sector reform to ensure that the inclusion of private participation did not disrupt its 
control over the ports. Not only did Transnet use high port prices to extract rents to 
cross-subsidise its loss making divisions but it also cross subsidised the mining sector 
of the South African economy. Cross-subsidisation of port profits to the mining sector 
can be attributed to the 'Mineral Energy Complex' a term coined by (Fine and 
Rustomjee, 1996). Despite the change in South Africa's industrial policy in 1996, large 
conglomerates in the mining and energy sector continue to influence policy in the 
country and this issue will be further discussed in relation to cross-subsidisation and the 
port reform experience in South Africa. This dissertation aims at addressing the above 
issues by identifying what exactly happened during port reform and why it happened as 
below. 
An Overview of Port Reform: What Happened and Why 
Port sector reform (both of the institutional arrangements and pricing) was very limited, 
and very slow. 
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(i) The reform process was initiated later than restructuring processes in other 
infrastructure sectors in South Africa (electricity white paper 1998 and 
telecommunications white paper 1996)-- as exemplified by the issuing of a ports white 
paper (only 2002), and of legislative change (only in 2005). 
(ii) The implementation of reform also proceeded at a slow pace, as exemplified by: 
A failure to adjust prices to eliminate the rent extraction (from ports to Transnet), 
and across different segments of the economy such as from manufacturing to mining; 
• A failure to implement the landlord model, except on very small margins; and 
A failure to put in place an independent regulator with the mandate to set port 
prices. 
An explanation as to why port reform was this way is that, in a political economy of 
'multiple principals', Transnet won sufficient autonomy from its principals to pursue an 
autonomy-seeking, financial independence strategy - and used cross-subsidies from 
ports to offset losses elsewhere. It was to maintain this autonomy that port sector reform 
was so slow. 
Underlying this explanation is that rent extraction from ports has been part of a broader 
political economy equilibrium in South Africa which prioritises rent extraction and rent 
sharing over the creation of a competitive economy. 
Section 1.2: Methodology 
The conventional economic discourse on policy choices is to think of them through the 
lens of welfare economics and efficiency. This dissertation will not use this approach as 
it does not explain the policy outcomes of this topic. Conceptually, the hypothesis of the 
methodology used in this paper is that the outcomes we will soon observe are the result 
of strategic multi-stakeholder bargaining. The methodology for explaining my questions 
and addressing my key hypotheses is "process tracing" and "analytic narratives". To 
understand institutional change and variation, five scholars influenced by Douglas C. 
North used tools of economic institutionalism to investigate questions of governance of 
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the economy and polity, interstate relations and political economy in a book titled 
Analytical Narratives (Levi, 2002). The book provides the concept of institutions being 
formal and informal rules that influence behaviour by means of incentives and 
constraints (Levi, 2002). 
Analytical Narratives 
The key features of analytical narratives are summarised by (Levy, 2011) as below: 
Rational choice, with game theory as an analytic platform: "In an effort to move from 
[description] to explanation, we move from 'thick' accounts to 'thin' forms of reasoning. 
We seek to highlight and focus upon the logic of the processes that generate the 
phenomena we study. In doing so, we use rational choice theory. We find game 
theoretic models particularly useful ways of exploring the validity of narrative 
accounts .... We seek to construct the game that provides the link between the prominent 
features of the narrative and its outcome" (Bates et ai, 1998 cited in Levy, 2011: 17). 
Linking games and empirical research: "We seek to account for outcomes by identifying 
and exploring the mechanisms that generate them .... By reading documents, labouring 
through archives, interviewing, and surveying the secondary literature, we seek to 
understand the actors' preferences, their perceptions, their evaluation of alternatives, 
the information they possess, the expectations they form, the strategies they adopt, and 
the constraints that limit their actions. We seek to cut deeply into the specifics of a time 
and place, and to locate and trace the processes that generate the outcome of interest" 
(Bates et ai, 1998 cited in Levy, 2011: 17). 
Deduction and induction: Analytic narratives "blur the conventional distinction between 
deduction and induction .... The(ir) construction is an iterative process ... They depart 
from conventional notions of hypothesis testing. The dominant response to 
disconfirmation is reformulation not falsification .... We move back and forth between 
interpretation and case materials, modifying the explanation in light of the data, which 
itself is viewed in new ways, given our evolving understanding ... [so that] in the end we 
achieve a match between theory and case materials" (Bates et al,1998 cited in Levy, 
2011: 17) 
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• Generating theory. "Initially the theory is formed from the data; it is selected 
because it appears to offer a good fit. Rendered explicit, the theory then becomes 
vulnerable; it can be subject both to logical appraisal and to empirical testing" (Bates et 
ai, 1998 cited in Levy, 2011: 17). 
• Disciplining the narrative. "Theory places constraints upon the narrative; the 
account is constrained by the logic of the theory" (Bates et ai, 1998 cited in Levy, 
2011:17). 
Modifying theory. "The cases derive implications from theory; but when the case 
materials do not confirm their expectations, the authors respond by reformulating their 
models and by altering the way in which they think about the problem (Bates et ai, 1998 
cited in Levy, 2011: 17). 
Post diction. "When models highlight features of the data that hitherto have 
escaped attention; when they can be contradicted by the evidence; and when they 
predict relationships that must hold, if their equilibria capture the processes that 
generate the phenomena of concern - then we are well beyond mere exercises in curve 
fitting" (Bates et ai, 1998 cited in Levy, 2011: 17). 
Process Tracing 
Process tracing is a tool used for theory testing and development. It is used to link 
observations in a case study in ways that form an explanation of the case (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 207). In a world with multiple interactions it is difficult to explain the 
outcomes of several independent variables and this tool helps researchers explain such 
outcomes where statistical methods can only manage to do so with great difficulty 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 224). 
Within the framework of rational choice, process-tracing helps researchers construct 
detailed historical cases through empirical tracing of decision-making processes 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 208). 
The logic of process-tracing is that it enables one to drill down to the details of the 
narrative, to look at multiple alternative hypotheses and to be able to reject some of 
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them but not others. Here below is a table which presents a series of hypotheses in 
groups that explain the outcome of port reform in South Africa. The reasoning behind 
these hypotheses and which ones can be rejected will become evident once the story is 
told in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4; and the concluding Chapter 5, teases out the 
implications for each. Next is Chapter 2, which analyses the global trends in port reform. 
Box A: Hypotheses 
GROUP 1: Multiple Principals Hypothesis 
H1: Multiple principals as well as capture by strong SOE (Transnet) leveraging 
allies blocked reform. 
GROUP 2: Technocratic Hypotheses 
H2: Private participation and price rebalancing is bad policy. 
H3: Failure to reform is as a result of poor management. 
H4: Complexity and non-transparency of the pre-existing pricing and cross-
subsidisation regime added to the difficulty of reform efforts. 
GROUP 3: High-Level Politics Hypotheses 
H5: Labour unions have veto within the ANC alliance and therefore opposed private 
participation and successfully blocked reform. 
H6: Economic actors were resistant to productivity focused restructuring (,Mineral 
Energy Complex' and the unions) and have veto power. 
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CHAPTER 2: GLOBAL TRENDS IN PORT REFORM 
Globalisation and trade liberalisation have over the past few decades generated a trend 
of institutional reform all over the world. It is for this reason that significant 
developments have been identified in transport and logistics technologies, changing the 
landscape of business operations in various ports of the globe. These developments 
have involved the change of ownership structure of ports from public to private, altering 
of the institutional structure of port services and changing port labour practises (World 
Bank, 2007). Global port reform is in line with neo-liberal ideas which emphasise limited 
public sector intervention in the national economy, increased privatisation and 
commercialisation of public enterprises. 
Global trends in port reform provided the backdrop and framework for South Africa's 
port reform. This chapter discusses best practise in port reform and thereafter, 
showcases port reform experiences in Colombia where successful private participation 
in the ports has taken place, as well as Argentina where port reform has resulted in a 
mixture of management models but has still produced positive results. The discussion 
on pricing reform will come later in the dissertation. What is necessary first is to 
understand how a port operates and the next section of this chapter helps to do just 
that. 
Section 2.1: Introduction to Ports and Port Functions 
A port is a gateway to an inter-modal transport system connecting sea and land 
transport and it functions essentially to aid the transfer of cargo and passengers (Port 
regulator 2010: 13). Ports provide marine and cargo-working infrastructure facilities to 
port users who fall into two broad sets of economic actors-vessel owners whose 
assets utilise the former infrastructure and cargo-owners whose goods pass through the 
latter infrastructure with the use of cargo distribution as well as cargo- handling services 
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(Port Regulator: 2010: 13). The sequence of events that take place as a cargo- carrying 
vessel arrives and leaves a port will help highlight the functions of a hypothetical port.4 
A vessel carrying 500 containers calls at the port of Cape Town to discharge and pick 
up more cargo before sailing. This vessel will first encounter port control and vessel 
tracking services. It will announce its arrival and ask for berthing information. While here 
the vessel consumes marine services associated with safe vessel tracking conduct and 
will either proceed to safe anchorage or be asked to proceed to the pilot boarding to 
await a harbour pilot. The latter step leads to an instruction to weigh anchor and 
approach the pilot ground. The tangible service used thereafter is pilotage service either 
by boat or helicopter. The vessel starts to use marine infrastructure before or after pilot 
boarding depending on the port in question. This intangible asset includes navigational 
aids such as breakwaters and fairways in optimal water depth. This infrastructure 
enables the vessel to safely enter and exit the port. Tug services are part of marine 
services that are determined by vessel size. Harbour tugs are provided at the entrance 
of the port so as to provide safe port entry and movement to an allocated berth. 
4The port call example was adapted from an Economic Review of Participation in Ports Operations and 
Services in South Africa by the Port Regulator of South Africa (Port Regulator, 2010: 13- 15). 
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Figure 4: Schemat ic Representation of the Processes and Services to Ships and 
Cargo Moving Through a Port 







Source UI\CTAD, 1995 cited in Port Regulator 2QlO. 14 
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Our vessel IS now within the pori area and contlnlles to travel through marine 
infrastructure such as dredged channels with the help of tugs and the pilot to tho berih 
or quay allocated to it with appropriate water depth Berthing services are provided by 
berthing personnel who secure the vessels mooring lines safely to the quayside. At this 
point, the vessel IS ready for cargo discharge. 
The land behind the berth IS intangible cargo-handling Infrastructure It can also include 
road access and rail lines to the terminal area of the port. Without these assets , cargo-
handling activities cannot take place although the assets in themselves do not transfer 
cargo from the ship to the shore and vice versa. 
The cargo working superstructure comprises various infrastructure including wharf 
sheds and cranes, bulk ship loaders and unloaders, stacking areas, intermodal 
interfaces and container gantries. A container vessel port, which is where our 
hypothetical vessel is going to dock, provides other superstructure such as container 
handling gantries to move standard freight containers between the ship and the shore. 
Cargo handling services such as stevedores enable the physical transfer of goods to 
and from the ships to warehouses, rail wagons or road vehicles. 
Mentioned above are the core functions of a port although the functions also depend on 
whether a port is a full service port or a diversified port. The services of a port need to 
be tailored in such a way as to accommodate the ships that utilise the main terminals of 
a specific port area. 
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Box B: Categories of Port Assets 
Basic Port Illfl'astl'llctUI't.>: 
• ~'laritillle ac ce s s channels. 
• Port entrance. 
• Protective l\lorks. including breakwaters and 
shore protection. 
• Sea loch 
• Access to tbe port for inland trampolt 
(roads and nUUleJs) 
• Rail connection bet\veen the lunteriaud and 
the port. 
• Inland waten"a),'> within the pon area and 
connecting port areas with their Junterlalld 
Opt.>ra.tiollal Port Illfl' a struc tlll't.> : 
• Inlier pOlt channels and nlfning and port bas11ls. 
• Revetments and slopes. 
• Roads. nlIlnels. bridges. and locks in the 
port area. 
• Qu.ay \valls. jetfles. and finger pters. 
• Aids to lla\'igatioll. buoys. and beacons. 
• Hydro and meteorological systems. 
• SpecIfic mooring buoys. 
o Vessel traffic management "ystem. 
• Patrol ami fire-fight11lg ;;esse1s. 
Source: Adapted from (World Bank, 2007). 
o Doch. 
o Port land (excluding superstrucnlre and paving). 
o Access roads to general road inirastmcture. 
• Rail cOlmection to general raillIlfrastnlcnlfe. 
and marshalling yards. 
• Dry docks for siup reparr 
Port Supt.>ntl'lIdurt.>: 
• Panng and suri:1cing. 
• Temullallighting. 
• Parking areas. 
o Sheds, "varehouses. and stacking areas. 
o Tank ['lum and silos, 
• Offices. 
• Repau shops. 
o Other buildings required for terminal operations. 
Port Equipmt.>llt: 
• Tugs. 
o Line handling vessels. 
• Dredgmg equipment. 
• Ship and shore handling equipment. 
o Cargo hancllmg equipment (apron and termi!}'1!) 
Section 2.2: Global Best Practise of Port Reform 5 
Port reform began around the 1980's during a time when most ports were becoming 
bottlenecks to efficient distribution chains due to congestion and poor service quality. 
The main reason for ports failure to respond to the increasing demand of globalisation is 
that most ports around the world were controlled by the central government. Central 
planning was often characterised by hierarchical planning, control and command 
structures which were slow-paced and rigid (World Bank, 2007: 71), The introduction of 
market-oriented policies in the 1980s led to decentralised port management which 
reduced government intervention towards port systems. Another reason for poor 
5This section draws heavily on Module 3 of the World Bank Port Reform Toolkit, 2007, 
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services in the ports was government's inability and at times unwillingness to invest in 
expensive port infrastructure. This has over the years led to governments spreading 
investment risks through joint undertakings as well as relying on private investors to 
reduce ports' dependence on state budgets (World Bank, 2007: 71). 
Port development is usually undertaken by the government in many countries with the 
argument that investments in port assets have strong direct and indirect multiplier 
effects on the whole economy. Furthermore, many governments believe that the 
commitment of public resources encourages commercial investments towards port 
development. Port operations on the other hand, according to (World Bank, 2007:75) 
are businesses in their own right and should be managed to achieve optimal utilisation 
of capital. In terms of the structure of port management and port development policy, 
there is a wide spectrum of institutional frameworks that range from one end, the 
"service port" in which full public control over planning, regulation and operations result. 
On the other end of the spectrum there lies the almost total absence of public control, 
ownership or regulatory oversight resulting in the "fully privatised port" (World Bank, 
2007; Brooks and Cullinane, 2006). The past few years have witnessed the diminishing 
role of government in the ports industry although the total absence of public involvement 
still remains limited to specialised ports and terminals. Below is a brief description of 
four categories of port management that have emerged over time. These main port 
models are: the service port, the tool port, the landlord port and the private service port. 
The Service Port Model 
This is the characteristic port model of most developing countries before devolution 
pressures. This model comprises a port authority owning all assets and land as well as 
performing all port functions and regulatory activities. The port authority is usually under 
the Ministry of Transport and the Chairman is usually required to report directly to the 
Minister of Transport. The absence of private sector involvement means that the same 
organisation regulates, develops infrastructure and superstructure and provides 
operational activities (Brooks and Cullinane, 2006:408). 
The Tool Port Model 
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This model includes private and public sector participation. The development and 
maintenance of port infrastructure is provided by the public sector port authority. All 
equipment owned by the port authority is operated by the port authority staff and this 
equipment may include quays, cargo handling equipment and forklift trucks (Brooks and 
Cullinane, 2006:408). The private sector on the other hand, operates small companies 
such as cargo handling firms. This port has similarities with the service port model in 
terms of public orientation and financing of ports. 
The Landlord Port 
In this model, the port authority still owns the land but the infrastructure is leased to 
private operators. These private operators maintain their own superstructure including 
buildings, purchase and install the equipment on the terminal ground as well as hire 
dock labour. 
Private Service Port Model 
All operations, capital and regulation in this model, are provided by the private sector. 
The management of ports is market-oriented and investment in port operations is 
flexible. This approach could result in monopolistic behaviour as the public sector is not 
able to influence the activities of the ports (Brooks and Cullinane, 2006:409). 
In terms of regulation of the port systems, the higher the competition of the ports in 
terms of pricing factors, the less regulatory intervention required. The figure below 
illustrates how the four port models array themselves on scales measuring private 
sector risk and the need for independent government oversight (World Bank, 2007: 15). 
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Figure 5: Public- Private Balance of Regulation and Risk 
Source (World Bank 2007) 
Port Reform Strategies and Options 
In order to improve port organisation and operation, governments select from a variety 
of strategies, These strategies include modernisation of port administration and 
management, liberalisation or deregulation of port services, commercialisation , 
corporatisation and prlvatisation all depending on the requirements of the ports in 
question, 
Box C: Port Reform Options 
Modernisation of port administration 
liberalisation or deregulation of port 
services 
This enables the alteration of the 
, organisation without changing national 
policy, It entails the introduction of suitable 
systems, working practices or equipment 
to port administration to Improve port 
erformance, 
This enables the participation of private 
, companies by removing government rules 
and regulations that previously allowed 
Commercialisation 
______ -t'0~'"'y'-"'the __ public secto! to operate, _ I This enables a public port t~_ have more 
-----
-
autonomy in its decision making without 
transforming it into a private company. It 
adopts the accounting and management 
principles of private firms to become more 
efficient and Qrofitable. 
Corporatisation The legal status if a public port enterprise 
is changed to the legal status of a private 
company although the public sector retains 
ownership. All assets and land leasing 
rights are transferred to this private 
company although land ownership remains 
with the port authori!l. 
Privatisation The most complex of port reform and 
involves "the transfer of ownership of 
assets from the public to private sector or 
the application of private capital to fund 
investments in port facilities, equipment 
and systems." (UNCTAD, 1998 cited in 
World Bank, 2007: 100). 
Source: Compiled by Author from (World Bank, 2007: 100). 
Options for Participation in Port Operations 
In order to improve the performance and efficiency of ports, governments have the 
option of contracting out to the private sector, activities which were initially conducted by 
the public port management. This can take place by contracting out some operations 
through a tender-bid procedure. A separate contract for the management of the public 
port authority of terminal operator can also be awarded. This occurs when a port 
authority experiences continual poor management as well as inadequate financial 
stability. 
A management contract is a practice in which the government agrees with a private 
sector operator to provide adequate and efficient service to all customers as well as 
employ the existing staff (World Bank, 2007: 110). The expiration of the contract is 
usually between three and five years leading to a renewal of the contract or it is 
awarded to another party (World Bank, 2007: 110). A management contract can also 
lead into the granting of a more extensive concession. 
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Governments are still involved in port management through public landlord port 
authorities in concession agreements. The term concession is referred to as: 
"An arrangement whereby a private party (concessionaire) leases assets 
from a public authority for an extended period and has responsibility for 
financing specified new fixed investments during the period and for providing 
specified services associated with the assets; in return, the concessionaire 
receives specified revenues from the operation of the assets; the assets 
revert to the public sector at expiration of the contract." (World Bank, 2001 
cited in Port Regulator, 2010: 56). 
Concessions allow governments to retain ownership of the port land and safeguard 
public interests while at the same time; relive them from the financial burden and 
operational risks. The two main forms of concessions are lease contracts and 
concession contracts. 6 
';r Leasehold Agreements 
Leases provide a substantial amount of revenue for landlord ports and usually only land 
or warehouse facilitates are leased. Berthing fees are paid during instances where the 
port authority leases its berths. Flat rate and shared revenue leases are the two main 
leases commonly used for multiuser and single-user terminals or berths. The lessee has 
the right to use a fixed asset for a specific period of time in exchange for periodic 
payments of a fixed amount for a flat rate lease. The shared revenue lease on the other 
hand involves the lessor giving the lessee the right to use a fixed asset for a fixed period 
of time although in exchange for a variable amount of money. There is a minimum 
payment regardless of the level of activity at the port but no maximum payment. This 
lease agreement enables the port authority to maximize employment levels, revenue 
and throughput while the lessee benefits from any additional activity after minimum 
throughput levels are attained (World Bank, 2007: 112). 
6Lease contracts refer to when an operator engages in a long-term on port land and is responsible for 
superstructure and equipment while the concession contract refers to a contract in which the operator 
covers investment costs and assumes all commercial risks (World Bank, 2007: 112). 
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'y Concession Agreements 
As mentioned earlier, concession agreements enable the transfer of investment costs 
from the public to the private sector. Build-operate-transfer (BOT) schemes often stem 
from concession agreements. These schemes are a specialised form of concession 
designed to increase private financial participation in the construction of port 
superstructure and infrastructure without changing the landlord structure of the port. 
They are specific agreements between the port authority and the special purpose 
company (SPC) created by the concessionaire to construct and operate a port 
development. The ownership of the assets is retained by the port authority while the 
commercial risks of providing and operating the assets is moved to the private 
concessionaire. Other schemes like BOT include Build-own-operate (BOO), Equip-
operate-transfer (EaT), Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) and Build-own-operate-transfer 
(BOOT) (World Bank, 2007:118). 
Above is the general overview of port reform strategies and options provided by the 
World Bank to assist countries move towards institutional reform of ports around the 
world. The reform process usually needs to be built up from a near zero basis and 
therefore the tool kit was designed to provide background information that would serve 
to assist reforms in various countries. The next section of this chapter will provide 
examples of two countries which undertook port reform. This is so as to put the above 
tools and methods of reform into perspective. We will look at reform in Colombia where 
successful private participation in the ports has taken place and Argentina where port 
reform has resulted in a mixture of management models. 
Colombia 
In the early 1990's four public ports in Colombia were concessioned using public-private 
partnerships (Gaviria, 1998 cited in Farquharson et aI, 2011: 5). This reform was 
initiated in order to address structural problems of poor productivity, high pension costs 
and increase competition. The concessionaires were given 20-year concessions in 
which they were responsible for managing each port and contracting with port operators 
for the use of the ports (Gaviria, 1998, cited in Farquharson et aI, 2011: 5). 
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As a regulator for concessions , a General Port Superintendent was established , laws 
were established to abolish restrictive labour and stevedoring services were allowed to 
compete in each port freety (Gavina, 1998 cited in Farquharson et ai, 2011' 5). 
Furthermore, Colpuertos. a former public port authoflly was dismantled and a new 
pension fund was established in order to cover labour retrenchment. 
The result of port reform In Colombia is such that there has been a strong Increase In 
productivity and decrease in user fees Competition of stevedoring and between ports 
has increased , there are attractive returns to the concessionaires and a consistent flow 
of revenues to the government through payment for the leasing of par1 facilities (Gaviria, 
1998 Cited in Farquharson et ai, 2011: 5) 
Concessionaires have continued to illCrease private investment in container cranes and 
shore side equipment as encouraged by evidence of success In the port reform of 
Colombia 
Box D: Periormance Improvcments sincc Private Concessioning in 1994: Port of 
Colpucrtos (Colombia)7 
Contaonemroip wailing!me 1000.)'8 «::2 hoo.,. 
Conla<nemhip lumaround lme 72 hOUi'>l n","" 
Gros.; prodl.chitylhour 7 movesi.hip M<.Jr 52 moveslship holr 
B..-th occupancy 90 percent SO percent 
Coot per mo"" "" "', Bulk calllO productivity 500 ton&IVM1lellday 3,900-4,500 tonsIvMM~d"'l 
Houts worked peor day " " C"11O dw<'l lme 3O+days 
""~ Port coots $984Jpoor move $222/per move 
Source: {Kenland Hochstein, 1995 ciled In World Bank, 2007 -2 ) 
The former nallona l publ.: part entity is COLPUERTOS and $oc>edad POI1uari a Regional de Cargagena 
{SPRC), IS a regional pa rt entity resu lting from the reform process. 
Argentina 
Before the early 1990's, Argentine ports were characterised by major corruption issues, 
insufficient investment, high tariffs combined with economically irrational subsidies, a 
messy institutional situation and declining traffic (Serebrisky and Trujillo, 2005: 192). 
Port reform in Argentina began in 1992 with an agenda to improve service quality and 
efficiency as well as reduce public service provision in the ports. Within 5 years a 50 per 
cent decrease in container terminal handling price was achieved in the most important 
ports of the country (Port Regulator, 2010: 77). 
Argentina has 40 public ports under provincial management and one port named Port of 
Buenos Aires administrated by the National government. Thirty ports in Argentina are 
private ports and mainly specialise in industrial products and grain with importance in 
general cargo increasing steadily (Port Regulator, 2010: 77). 
In 1992, the freedom to establish tariffs and abolishment of labour agreements which 
hindered productivity in port operations was achieved by the liberalisation of all 
contractual stevedoring companies as well as deregulation of pilotage and towing 
services. Any operator is allowed to enter the port sector, build, manage and operate a 
port for commercial, public, private, recreational or industrial use. All what is required of 
the operators is compliance with the standard supporting service requirements such as 
environmental regulations and customs (Port Regulator, 2010:77). 
Effective decentralisation of management and decision making power enabled the 
transfer of small ports directly to Provincial Governments and major ports such as 
Bahia Blanca, Santa Fe and Buenos Aires Provinces but subject to the Sociedades de 
Administracion Portuaria (SAP-Port Administration Societies) which are private entities 
in charge of maintenance of ports infrastructure and common use areas. SAP receives 
tariffs for infrastructure and fees from concessionaires and the profits are used to invest 
into the ports. Some of the Provinces have decentralised themselves to municipalities 
resulting in the closure of a lot of small ports considered redundant by the Provinces 
(Port Regulator, 2010:77). 
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Each port has adopted the best model to Its preferences and constraints and this has 
led to a wide spectrum of management modes varied trom centralised provincial 
systems to autonomous administrations Full concessions have been granted to private 
operators in some cases and inter-port competition has reduced the need for price 
regulation processes 
There is evidence that reforms have paid off so far Argentine ports allowed a fourfold 
Increase in container traffic from 249,000 TEUs in 1990 to 1, 070,000 TEUs in 2000 
(Serebrisky and Trujillo 2005' 192) What Argentina lacks is an independent port 
re9ulator to monitor the activities pertormed in the ports_ Below is a snippet of the 
results of Argentina's port reform, 
Box E: Selected performance indicators for Port of Buenos Aires 
Cargo (thousands of tons) 4,000 6,000 
Containers (thousands of TEUs) "" "" Capacity (thousand~ 01 containers per year) "'" , ,coo Op .... ational area (hectares) "' "' Productivity (Ions per worker per year) "'" ',000 Average stay lor lu i containern (days) 2.' " Cost for container imports ($ per ton) '''' '''' Port tartff for exports ($ per ton) " ,." Port tarrff for imports ($ per ton) 2. , " 
Source' (Colombia General Port Superintenden t 1997 cited in World Bank, 2007 3) 
These are the global trends in port reform. The next chapter dl9S deep Into the evolution 
of institutional port reform in South Afflca, 
CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICA'S TURBULENT 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROCESS 
Section 3.1: The Rise and Fall of the Effort to Bring Private 
Participation into the Port Sector 
As of the late 1990s, South Africa appeared to be embracing a model of port reform 
which involved substantial private participation. However, by 2008 it had backed off 
entirely from that effort. To understand what happened, we will look carefully at the 
sequence of decision points, and the preferences and actions of the relevant 
stakeholders. 
Ordinarily, in examining the design and implementation of new policies, the presumption 
is that the policy design is coherent, set by a single, well-defined principal and then, 
implemented more or less effectively. An alternative preposition, laid out conceptually 
by (Khan, 2010) and (Levy, 2014) is that in some circumstances there can be multiple 
principals, with the eventual policy decisions as an outcome of contestation between 
them. As this chapter will demonstrate, the latter is a better depiction of the reality of 
South Africa's policy making vis-a-vis private participation in the ports. 
By analysing the interaction among the principals and agents of port reform in South 
Africa-what exactly happened and the outcome, we will be able to learn something 
about the political settlement of the country through the manner in which the game 
played out. 
(Khan, 2010: 4) provides a good concept of political settlements and how they influence 
the evolution of institutions in developing and developed countries. According to (Khan, 
2010) "A political settlement is a combination of power and institutions that is mutually 
compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability. Institutions 
and the distribution of power have to be compatible because if powerful groups are not 
getting an acceptable distribution of benefits from an institutional structure they will 
strive to change it. But the compatibility also has to be sustainable because institutions, 
both formal and informal, have to achieve the minimum levels of economic performance 
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and political stability that are required for the reproduction of particular societies" (Khan, 
2010:4). 
Depending on the type of political settlement, if the benefits obtained by powerful 
groups of the society are low, these groups will strive to change institutions even 
through conflict, until they are satisfied or they give up (Khan, 2010:4). During the 
process of contestation, the compatibility between power and institutions can lead to 
either an unviable political settlement, where change can come about through the 
evolution of institutions or the organisation of power. Political settlements are 
continuously evolving in all societies but they differ in developing and developed 
countries. 
According to (Levy, 2014: 28), there are early-stage regimes with dominant political 
leadership and others where political leadership is selected competitively. There are 
also dominant and competitive categories which are early and late-stage regimes. In a 
dominant political settlement, there is a huge gap between violence potential of the 
rulers and the opponents. It takes an extraordinary commitment level for the opponents 
to challenge a rulers' strong grasp on power. At 'equilibrium' the 'principal', can govern 
by engaging others in the country as 'agents' (Levy, 2014:39). In a competitive political 
settlement, there is a narrower gap between the violence potential of rulers and 
opponents. It takes a much lower level of commitment for opponents to mount challenge 
against a ruling party with strong excluded factions for example. In equilibrium, the 
rulers respect rules of the game provided by the competitive settlement through an 
agreement among principals (Levy, 2014: 40). 
Now within these political settlements are institutions in which 'actors' (organisations 
and individuals) interact within institutional 'rules of the game' which constrain their 
actions (Levy, 2014: 31). These actors interact differently--depending on the political 
settlement and their preferences-to attain rents-which are "returns which exceed the 
opportunity cost of resources which might otherwise be deployed in a competitive 
market" (Levy, 2014: 34). 
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Our next exercise will demonstrate through the lens of institutional economics and 
political settlements, what played out in South Africa's effort towards institutional port 
reform but before we proceed to that, the next section helps us understand where the 
ports are coming from in terms of institutional arrangements prior to reform. 
Section 3.2: A Brief Background of Port Institutional Arrangements in 
South Africa 
With the unification of the colonies in 1910, the South African Railways and Harbours, 
(SAR&H) was established. This state department offered an integrated national 
transportation system of air, road, rail, and pipeline and also owned and controlled the 
seaports of the Republic of South Africa (Wiese, 1981 :26). Both harbour and railway 
authorities were unified due to conflict among the colonies as well as due to inter-port 
competition. The SAR&H was regulated by the law since 1910 to run on sound business 
principles generating revenue to sustain itself. As a semi-government organisation, 
SAR&H provided a central administration, planning, coordination and operation of the 
transport services mentioned above. A uniform tariff structure was therefore established 
which led to the decrease in inter-port competition. The tariff structure was created in 
such a way as to provide cheaper transport for industrial and agricultural sectors (Giladi, 
2003 cited in Chasomeris, 2006: 1 01) which was in line with the import substitution trade 
policy enacted at the time. It was during this time that the inception of cross-
subsidisation of surplus profits obtained from harbour activities began to be used to 
cover losses incurred by railways (Jones, 1988 cited in Chasomeris, 2006: 102). 
A business enterprise wholly owned by the state, South African Transport Services 
(SATS) was established by the South African Transport Services Act of 1981 which 
replaced the existence of SAR&H. This new business entity was created with changes 
to port pricing and governance policy and in 1982 the physical capital of the ports was 
placed under the control of the new administration. Rather than just paying attention to 
the agriculture and industrial sector, the Act required that the transport needs of the 
whole country be taken into consideration. To avoid demarcation problems of ports and 
railways, SATS ensured that all cargo functions fell under port administration (Jones, 
1988 cited in Chasomeris, 2006: 102). With the uniformity of port tariffs which did not 
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take into consideration the commercial differences of the ports, it was difficult for SATS 
to operate according to business principles. Although the ports experienced improved 
profits, there was still an issue of inter-port and inter-modal cross-subsidisation. 
In the 1980's a commission by the Department of Transport forming one of the De 
Villiers reports, revealed that the strategy of SATS entailed cross-subsidisation of 
profits, competitive advantage was not utilised adequately and; return on capital was 
inconsistent with investment utilisation (De Villiers, 1986 cited in Modubu, 2009: 3). 
Furthermore, the strategy was redundant as the market demand for transports services 
had radically changed since the initial establishment of the transport administration. The 
legal structure of SATS was deemed inadequate to operate as a commercial entity and 
required necessary revision. 
The results of the De Villiers commission led to the transformation of SATS into a 
business enterprise. In 1989 the Legal Succession to the South African Transport 
Services Act gave effect to some of the proposals presented in the De Villiers report. 
This Act established a public company known as Transnet Limited. The sole 
shareholder of Transnet is the state and its rights reside with the Department of Public 
Enterprises, while those of the Corporation lie with the Department of Transport 
(Transnet, 1991). 
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Section 3.2.1: Introducing the Stakeholders 
Figure 6: An Organogram of Stakeholders Involved In the Efforts to Introduce 
Private Participation to the Ports 
A.'IC"" '411CK 
SOOfGe Compiled by author 
The diagram above shows the stakeholders that were involved in the institutional reform 
of the ports . South Africa is currently under the rule of the African National Congress 
(ANC) and under this bracket are the ANC all iance, the Departments of Public 
Enterprises and Transport as well as labour unions such as the South African Transport 
and All ied Workers Union (SATAWU)_ The ANC IS a polit ical party but in principal 
governs in an all iance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of 
South African Trade Union (COSATU) 
The Department of Public Enterprises (OPE) as mandated by the then President of 
South Africa. Thabo Mbeki, initiated a restructuring program in 2000 which was 
designed around strategies and options to maximise shareholder interests of State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) . The main strategy for this program was the introduction of 
the private sector to SOE operations through concesSions and private-publ ic 
partnerships. It being the shareholder representative and oversight of government for 
SOE's including Transnet, DPE's role in the reform process was centred on the above 
mandate which would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of SOEs including the 
port company under Transnet. 
The Department of Transport is committed to the development of the transport system 
in South Africa. It is within this context that its role was to develop and maintain the 
national policy on the commercial ports as we shall see below. South African Transport 
and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) and other unions acted as opponent's to reform 
efforts ideologically and as we shall see in the next sections, their preference was to 
retain jobs after the introduction of the private sector. 
Transnet is the umbrella transport SOE under the Department of Transport and the 
Department of Public Enterprises. Further analysis of the governance structure of 
Transnet goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. Such analysis would be highly 
desirable. It would enable us to delve deeper into understanding the specifics of the 
arrangement of the multiple principals of Transnet, which have different objectives from 
one another.8 
Portnet was a division of Transnet in charge of the ports. As we shall observe in the 
next sections, its actions present us with the understanding that in its capacity, Portnet 
agreed to a segmented strategy of a National Port Authority (NPA) and operations arm 
South African Port Operations (SAPO) in order to increase port productivity as well as 
returns to itself (here meaning the NPA) and its shareholders. On the other hand, during 
the adoption of port legislation, the NPA was against the introduction of a Port 
Regulator. The introduction of the Port Regulator was seen as a threat to NPA as it 
would substantially decrease the powers of the Authority. In this view, the NPA's actions 
are mixed and we will see how this is played out in the sections to follow. 
8According to (Levy, 1986: 77), the various agents of the state see their mission as different from one 
another thus multiple principals can create space for management to trade off against each other in order 
to pursue their goals. We will see evidence of such interplay among these players in this as well as the 
next chapter. 
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The industrial and commercial users of the ports are involved in the shipping of products 
for business. For these actors, the introduction of private participation would certainly 
improve on the productivity of the ports which would increase their returns. 
With the introduction of the stakeholders, we need to know the key decisions that were 
made in the effort to introduce private participation in the ports. 
The key decision points made in line with private participation in the ports sector of 
South Africa were as follows: 
• The seeming embrace of private participation 
• The path to and production of the White Paper 
• Concessioning legislation 
• The National Ports Act of 2005 
• The experience with private participation subsequent to 2005 
The tables below provide a summary of what we learn from the blow by blow actions by 
stakeholders on these key decision points in Section 3.3.1 to 3.3.5 by using the 
methodology discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 on analytical narratives and process 
tracing. Through 'deduction' we identified the hypotheses which seem to explain the 
policy outcomes of this analysis and now through 'induction' of the analytical narrative, 
this chapter looks to reformulate and iterate the case materials from interpretation. This 
exercise will in the end generate the theory which matches with the case materials 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4 to "form equilibria of relationships and the processes that 
generate the phenomena" (Bates et ai, 1998; Levy, 2011). 
To put this differently, here is what chapter 3 does: 
• It gives summarised tables of the stakeholders who were for and against private 
participation; 
• It examines the specific decision processes surrounding private participation 
, 
(1996-2010) to learn what the de facto preferences are of each of the 
stakeholders and; 
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• It looks at the outcome of the decision process to learn the de facto relative 
strength of the different stakeholders. 
Box F: Stakeholders for Private Participation 
Stakeholders For Private De facto Key Actions 
participation Preferences for 
Private 
Participation 
1) Department of For To restructure the -Pushed for port 
Public ports as required restructuring but 
Enterprises by the mandate to lost to T ransnet 
restructure state- (See Sections 
owned 3.3.2.1, 3.3.2.2, 
enterprises. This 3.3.2.4, 3.3.2.5 
would increase and 3.3.3.1, 
port productivity 3.3.3.2, 3.3.3.4.1, 
which would 3.3.6) 
increase 
shareholder -Demanded an 
benefits. expedited process 





the labour unions 
to prevent protests 




2) Department of For To reduce - Spearheaded the 
Transport government's White paper on 
direct involvement National Transport 
in the provision Policy 1996 (See 
and operation of Section 3.3. 1. 1) 
services and 
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infrastructure -Organised a 
which would committee to 
enable a more establish a draft 
competitive ports policy 
environment and framework (See 
increase Section 3.3.2.1) 
efficiency, create 
- Organised the jobs and reduce 
cost of doing Draft National 
business at the Ports Bill and the 
ports (Department Ports Act (see 
of Transport, Section 3.3.3.4.2). 
1996). 
3) Industrial and For Private Participated in 
commercial participation would establishment of 
port users increase ports policy (See 
productivity at Section 3.3.2.1). 
ports which would 
Demanded prompt promote increased 
profits due to reform to improve 
lower cost of productivity (See 
shipping as well Section 3.3.2. 1). 
as increased Entered into 
profits through partnerships with 
concessions. Black Economic 
Empowerment 
(BEE) enterprises 





4) Portnet For (Actually Private - Agreed to split 
mixed see next pa rticipation Portnet into 
Box G, Row 6 for would: authority and 
actions operations (See 
AGAINST). - reduce reliance Section 3.3.1.2, 
on Transnet, 3.3.3.2) 
parent company 
which would in 
turn enable the 
retention of profits 
made by Portnet; 
- increase 
revenues coming 






well as lower costs 
at the ports. 
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Box G: Stakeholders against Private Participation 
Stakeholders Against Private De facto Key Actions 
participation Preferences for 
Private 
Participation 
5) SATAWU Against (with Opposition was Protested; 
and other some both because demanded 
labour qualifications). workers were participation in 
unions likely to lose jobs policy discussions 
once private and; managed to 
sector was negotiate with 
introduced and an government for 
ideological job retention after 
opposition to private sector 
private introduction to 
participation but ports (See 
were seemingly Sections 3.3.2.2, 
willing to 3.3.2.4, 3.3.3.1, 
negotiate. 3.3.3.2, 3.3.3.4.1, 
3.3.3.5 and; 
3.3.3.6) 
6) Portnet Against (Actually The Port Stood against 
mixed see Regulator as the legislation in terms 
previous Box F, Authority would of having a Port 
Row 4) for actions disrupt the Regulator (See 
FOR) National Port Section 3.3.3.3) 
Authority from 
being its own 
regulator and its 
ability to 
maintain/increase 
port tariffs which 
would increase its 
revenue. 
7) Transnet Against To acquire policy -Constrained the 
and financial reform process 
independence UNTIL the idea of 
from its principals private 
in order to cross- participation was 
subsidise profits completely taken 
from the ports to off the table (see 
loss making Section 3.3. 1.2, 





Section 3.3: Evolution of Efforts to Address Low Productivity in the 
Ports 1994 - 2010 
As mentioned earlier, in order to deal with issues of low productivity at the ports, the 
South African Government embarked on a reform process which included substantial 
private participation. In 1996 the Department of Transport created the National 
Transport Policy which resulted in the establishment of the White Paper for Commercial 
Ports Policy in 2002. In 2000, the Department of Public Enterprises was mandated to 
restructure State-Owned Enterprises and with this came the restructuring of Transnet. 
This process involved privatisation of entities, private-public partnerships and other 
strategies in order to increase the competitiveness of the developmental state. In order 
to introduce private participation in the ports, Portnet was split into a landlord and 
operations arm NPA and SAPO respectively in 2002 following the White Paper on Ports 
Policy. It was also envisaged that NPA was to be corporatized as a separate entity 
outside Transnet-this presented problems for Transnet as well as its workers. 
The next sections will illustrate blow by blow exactly what transpired in the efforts to 
introduce private participation. We will see the interplay among actors who were for and 
against this effort and understand the de facto preferences for the various actors at 
particular time periods around the key decisions made towards this effort. 
Section 3.3.1: The Seeming Embrace of Private Participation-1994 - 1999. 
Section 3.3.1.1: The 1996 transport white paper. After South Africa's political 
transformation in 1994, the Department of Transport embarked on a policy review 
project. This project led to the tabling and approval of the White Paper on National 
Transport Policy in 1996. The policy intended to reduce government's direct 
involvement in the provision and operation of services and infrastructure to enable a 
more competitive environment (Department of Transport, 1996). 
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In relation to the ports, the White Paper highlighted that the trade sanctions of the 
apartheid legacy left the ports with a predominance of causal workers over permanent 
dock labour force, production inefficiency and high tariffs and in order to address these 
issues, the National Transport Policy White Paper proposed the following: 
• The establishment of a port authority with responsibilities for the development 
and maintenance of port infrastructure and the function of administering the port 
infrastructure to ensure the long-term developments benefit the needs of the 
economy; furthermore, the port authority was to regulate the operations of the 
ports by controlling tariffs and service standards in monopolistic situations, 
provide cost recovery basis as well as essential port services which the private 
sector would not be willing to take up (Department of Transport, 1996); 
• The port authority would be independent of any operating entity (Department of 
Transport, 1996); and 
• The port authority was to be regulated as well by a Port Regulator (Department 
of Transport, 1996) 
(This section shows us the de facto preferences of the Department of Transport being 
the establishment of a competitive economy with less government involvement. Within 
this framework, the ports would see improved productivity through the inclusion of the 
private sector, monitored by a Port Authority. The increased participation with regulation 
would boost returns to the economy (see Box F, Row 2)). 
3.3.1.2: Some early tensions. In 1997, Transnet announced the idea to split Portnet 
into a port authority and an operations arm. Transnet saw it necessary to concession 
port operations to the private sector but unbundle Portnet carefully enough not to disrupt 
the cash flows Transnet was receiving from its wharfage. This would involve the port 
authority remaining under Transnet to ensure the earnings from Portnets wharfage 
(Chalmers, 1999: 2). 
In 1999 the views of Portnet were such that, according to Portnet Manager, Robert 
Childs, the company was in favour of surrendering management of the ports to the 
private sector. Privatisation would be conducted through awarding of licenses and 
concessions by the port authority (South Africa: Port Privatisation Marches On, 1998) 
and this strategy would meet the demands of investment backlogs from the apartheid 
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era (Jenvey, 1999). The Port of Durban was seen to be the pilot project for the initial 
concessioning efforts. 
At a National Maritime conference in March of 1999, Childs explained the reasons for 
port sector reform as Transnet being the Port Authority in terms of the Legal Succession 
to SATS not having regulatory powers to construct new ports. On the other hand, 
Portnet as supplier of port services could not act as player and referee when allowing 
and regulating competing port services (Jenvey, 1999). He further mentioned that 
Transnet did not want to privatise the ports to establish private monopolies and that the 
port authority solution would only be feasible once Transnet's debt was resolved 
(Jenvey, 1999). Transnet had inherited debt from its predecessors (SAR&H and SATS) 
through financial commitments it assumed when the Legal Succession Act of 1989 was 
enacted (Van Niekerk, 2002: 5). Only after the debt issues were resolved could 
Transnet embark on the introduction of private participation in the ports. 
(In this section we witness two actors, Transnet and Portnet. Transnet's de facto 
preference here is to retain the ports in order to extract rents for debts it inherited from 
its predecessors and private participation would disrupt this process for Transnet (see 
Box G, Row 7). As for Portnet, its de facto preference is to improve productivity of the 
ports through private investment which would in turn; increase profits for the company 
(see Box F, Row 4)). 
Section 3.3.2: The Path to and Production of the White Paper on National 
Commercial Ports Policy 1999 - 2002. 
This section shows actions by the Department of Public Enterprises, the workers 
unions, international shipping companies, Transnet, Portnet and the Department of 
Transport in safeguarding their interests towards the ports. It is quite clear from this 
section which stakeholders were for and against private sector inclusion. 
3.3.2.1: Momentum builds for reform, 1999-2000. In March of 1999, Transnet 
was to broaden its participation in port governance particularly national policy, 
legislation and restructuring by setting up a formal advisory national ports forum 
consisting of all significant stakeholders (Chalmers, 1999a: 1). 
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Portnet was also preparing itself for the segmented approach of port operations and 
landlord. In a leaked internal memorandum on reshaping Portnet, it was indicated that 
South Africa's ports faced infrastructure backlog, had no formal policy or legislation to 
govern the ports system and that splitting the two divisions would provide for focused 
management and a chance to improve the skills of the two divisions. This new structure 
would enable the future restructuring of operations, the improvement of operational 
performance and consistency with governments thinking as set out in the transport 
white paper (Chalmers, 1999a: 1). 
The move to spilt Portnet was discussed with all major unions including South Africa 
Transport and Allied Workers' Union (SATAWU) and Technical Workers' Union who 
asserted that they supported the reform in principle and expressed the desire to 
become more involved in discussions on port reform in future (Chalmers, 1999a: 1). 
In April, 2000, an International Maritime Conference was held in Durban. Speaking at 
the conference was Derek Lawrance chief executive of Ladit Enterprises, a shipping 
company. He expressed the need for port reform and stressed that the system was 
showing signs of its apartheid history when policy was inward looking during the time of 
international isolation. Lacking natural harbours, the country built Richards Bay to export 
coal and Saldhana for iron and steel to generate foreign exchange and the outcome of 
this was the development of a world-class transport system. He continued, "Extensive 
railway network with low density was .not world class and the government taxed the 
ports to subsidise the railways, a system still in place" (Officials urge ports to revamp 
system, 2000). He also pointed out that while the government was confident about its 
plans for privatisation, the progress in Transnet had been slow. According to Lawrance 
a transformation of the racial composition of management led to the appointment of 
managers with little experience and the lack of money and debt in the company led to 
Transnet making erratic decisions. Lawrance warned of the trade-offs between 
economics and politics mentioning that South Africa had a history of developments for 
political reasons only to realise that they are not financially viable (Officials urge ports to 
revamp system, 2000). 
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Other shippers at the conference voiced their concerns about excessive delays for ships 
and cargo at the port, high wharfage charges, extra penalties on high-value export 
goods, high ocean transport freight costs and transit time (Officials urge ports to revamp 
system, 2000). 
In response to the shippers complaints, Transport Minister Dullah Omar said that the 
government had a vision of local ports permitting unhindered flow of goods through 
them at low cost and high private-sector participation and that the ports policy and 
legislation would be tackled by a committee, which would come up with a draft 
framework by July 2000 (Officials urge ports to revamp system, 2000). 
In August 2000, NPA, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Siyabonga Gama addressed a 
South African Chamber of Business briefing and mentioned that the completion of 
Portnet's division into two entities, a port authority and port operation was to be done by 
April of 2001 (Wadula, 2000: 14). He further stated that the challenges faced at the 
ports included reviewing existing contracts and allocations together with service-level 
agreements in order to establish standardised leases, standard operating and 
concession agreements and licenses across all ports (Wadula, 2000: 14). 
Gama recognised the need for South Africa to become an export-oriented country and 
Portnet's role was to ensure the provision of smooth running trade between South Africa 
and other countries. This he believed would be done through creating adequate 
infrastructure to combat the problems faced at the ports (Wadula, 2000: 14). Also 
speaking at the briefing was Tau Morwe, CEO of SAPO. He expressed Portnet's 
intention to make independent, all port-based cargo handling business by 2003 
(Wadula, 2000: 14). These businesses were to be self-sustainable and able to realise 
business growth rates through increasing shareholder value by creating independent 
port handling businesses that meet customer needs (Wadula, 2000: 14). 
(The actions in this section show Portnet (here NPA and SAPO) asserting its desire to 
improve productivity (see Box F, Row 4). We also see Transnet discussing the 
broadening of its participation in port legislation to safeguard its interests of retaining 
port profits (see Box G, Row 7). The preferences of the shipping companies are to 
support private participation so as to increase productivity at the ports (see Box F, Row 
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3). As for the unions, though introduced to the idea of private participation in this 
section, their de facto preferences will be revealed in the next section.) 
3.3.2.2: Opposition surfaces - but seemingly is overridden. In May 2000, 
Congress of South African Trade Unions' (COSATU) had a mass action campaign 
which included a pan-African conference on privatisation. COSATU expressed that 
privatisation was not always necessary and argued that strategic intervention by the 
state was vital to achieve development goals. COSATU's coordinator for fiscal, 
monetary and public sector policy Neva Makgetla voiced her concerns at the campaign 
in regards to Portnet. She argued that secretive, protected and hierarchal management 
led to inefficiencies, with Portnet wharfage costing three times the international norm 
(Bramdaw, 2000: 2). According to COSATU, state ownership is an end in itself in a 
democracy and therefore it is vital for the government to improve the assets and 
capacity of the state in order for society to direct development (Bramdaw, 2000: 2). 
September 2000 saw the conclusion of tough negotiations between Transnet 
Executives and government officials after the Public Enterprises Minister Jeff Radebe 
tabled the Transnet Pension Fund Amendment Bill which promised to substantially 
lessen the burden on Transnet's finances (Chalmers, 2000: 15). The most important 
aspect of this bill would arguably be that the new pension fund arrangement enabled 
Transnet's restructuring and partial privatisation programme to move forward 
(Chalmers, 2000: 15), including governments plans to introduce private sector 
concessions to Portnet. 
By the end of September, 2000 Radebe announced that the government was planning 
to publish its proposals for the restructuring of South Africa's ports by the end of 
October (Government to issue port restructuring plans by end of month, 2000). The 
policy document would include port operations being outsourced to the private sector in 
line with the framework policy which was issued in August of 2000; An Accelerated 
Agenda for the Restructuring of State-owned Enterprises (Department of Public 
Enterprises, 2000). This policy document discussed the need for Portnet to be split into 
a port authority and separate operations arm. 
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By November 2000, a draft ports policy had been completed by a top-level steering 
committee and was expected to be due for publishing by December of 2000. The ports 
policy was to be maintained by the transport department including the development of 
the regulatory framework and appointment of members of the regulatory body 
(Chalmers, 2000a: 3). 
This draft policy included the establishment of a port regulator. The regulator was to 
oversee the seven commercial ports and was at the time, expected to be established by 
2001 following the completion of the draft ports policy (Chalmers, 2000a: 3). The 
regulator was also expected to deal with issues such as vessel traffic, licensing, and 
concessioning while the port authority would oversee the long-term development of the 
ports, administer port infrastructure and regulate the operations of the ports. This port 
regulator was only established in 2009. The regulator's functions and the role it played 
in the reform process will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
(This section shows COSA TU's de facto preference to oppose private participation as 
an ideological opposition (see Box G, Row 5). We also witness in this section, one of 
Transnet's principals, Department of Public Enterprises displaying its de facto 
preference to restructure the SOE and its first step in doing so is to sort out Transnet's 
debt issue (see Box F, Row, 1). With the Pensions Bill, Transnet's preference to retain 
the ports to pay its debt is taken away. But as we shall see in the sections regarding the 
Ports Bill, Transnet has another plan up its sleeve). 
3.3.2.3: Restructuring and private participation gets underway. The new 
measures of the draft policy were such that private participation was expected to start 
playing a greater role through public private partnerships and concessions in port 
operations within the next 12 to 18 months. Within the time period, the Ports Act was 
also expected to be finalised-- meaning the Act was expected to be released by 2002 
(Chalmers, 2000a: 3). 
In December of 2000, Dudula Shipping, which is a Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) marine service company, entered into a joint venture with CSX World Terminals. 
This was a joint venture which would provide the United States based group an 
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opportunity to expand into privatised South African terminals (Jenvey, 2000: 7). The 
objective of this venture was that in the long-term, CSX World Terminals would become 
a concessionaire with Portnet for the operation of container terminals in Cape Town as 
well as Durban (Jenvey, 2000: 7). 
In August 2001, Bidvest, the largest listed service company on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) also expressed its interest in exploring new business opportunities with 
Portnet arising from the intended privatisation of its port operations as well as from 
increased exports in South Africa. 
(In this section, we see one of the de facto preferences of port users which is to 
participate in port operations for profit (see Box F, Row 3). 
3.3.2.4: Back and forth within Government and the ANC alliance. On March 20th , 
2002, the Portfolio Committee on Transport, having conducted hearings on the Draft 
White Paper on Commercial Ports Policy reported that it needed the following 
amendments in these four respects: 9 
(a) There was vagueness about the end-state institutional location of the NPA. 
Given the largely regulatory, landlord and strategic policy-making role envisaged 
for the NPA, they believed that the White Paper should have unambiguously 
stated that the NPA should, in its end-state, be answerable to the national 
Department of Transport (Parliament Monitoring Group, 2002). 
(b) The draft made a number of proposals on port operations restructuring. The 
Committee believed that any such restructuring was to be based on in-depth 
research into the sustainability of any proposal, and that this restructuring would 
involve effective negotiations within the context of the National Framework 
Agreement on the restructuring of state-owned enterprises (Parliament 
Monitoring Group, 2002). 
9 1nformation on the report was obtained from "Parliament Monitoring Group", 
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2002/comreports/020619pctransportreport.htm 
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(c) The draft introduced the notion of inter-port competition. The Committee 
believed that the White Paper would make it clear that any inter-port competition 
would be strictly within the framework of an overall, emerging South African 
growth and development strategy (Parliament Monitoring Group, 2002). 
(d) In general, the White Paper was to more clearly emphasise the critical and 
overarching necessity of aligning port policy with an emerging national growth 
and development strategy (Parliament Monitoring Group, 2002). 
In April 2002, Jeff Radebe announced that Cabinet had approved the ports policy and 
that a model for concessioning had to be finalised (Chalmers, 2002: 1). The plan at the 
time was for the NPA to receive proceeds of concessions which would be used for the 
development and maintenance of port infrastructure. 
Within the same month, a top-level task team was established to explore options for 
concessioning the ports (Chalmers, 2002: 1). The key challenge faced by the task team 
which comprised the Department of Transport, the Department of Public Enterprises 
and the Department of Trade and Industry was how to deal with issues of congestion in 
Durban port. 
In June, 2002 it was announced that a pilot scheme to concession Durban's container 
terminal would start within the year. SATAWU, Rob Davies, Trade and Industry 
Chairman of Parliamentary Portfolio Committee and Jermey Cronin, Transport 
Chairman of Parliamentary Portfolio Committee, called on more debate on the principle 
of concessioning as they believed it may not have been the best solution to the 
problem. Ben Martins, Public Enterprises Parliament Portfolio Committee Chairman 
agreed that clarity was necessary for certain issues debated (Ensor, 2002: 3). 
According to Cronin proper analysis of the problem had not been undertaken and the 
problem at the ports was universal and not specific to containers. He felt that 
concessioning was not the only solution to the problem at the ports and further 
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mentioned that Parliament needed to be involved in the policy formulation process as 
Cabinet had only decided to concession Durban Container Terminal (Ensor, 2002: 3). 
Also speaking at Parliament, General Manager of Policy and Implementation at the 
Transport Department, Jerry Makokoane, mentioned that the final white paper on the 
ports policy would be released in mid-July of 2002 (Ensor, 2002: 3). 
What happened instead was that in July 2002, three of the most influential transport 
labour unions (SATAWU, the United Transport and Allied Trade Union and SA Logistics 
Services Transport and Allied Workers Union) banded together to oppose the 
concessioning process and issued government with an ultimatum to halt the process, or 
face members refusing to allow winning bidders into the country's ports (Ensor, 2002: 
3). These labour unions felt that the move to concession Durban's container terminals 
was being imposed on them and that they would collectively agree to reject Cabinet's 
decision. According to the unions, no meaningful consultations or analysis had been 
conducted to verify that concessioning was the appropriate way to transform the ports 
(Chalmers, 2002a: 1). 
In this regard, Sivi Gounden, Public Enterprises Director-General mentioned that the 
Government remained committed to engaging the unions on the ports restructuring 
process within the auspices of the National Framework Agreement (NFA) governing the 
restructuring of state assets (Chalmers, 2002a: 1). 
Jeff Radebe also mentioned in his budget speech that the Durban proposal was in line 
with the National Ports Policy in which all stakeholders, including labour, participated. 
He further mentioned that labour would be given job security by new concessionaires 
for a minimum of three years, pension funds as well as other social security benefits 
(Chalmers, 2002a: 1). 
(The de facto preference of the ANC as government was to involve private participation 
in a manner that would continue to benefit the major shareholder of the ports. On the 
other hand, the labour unions maintained their stance to oppose reform with the 
preference to retain jobs after the inclusion of the private sector-- creating complications 
within the alliance (see Box G, row 5)). 
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3.3.2.5: The White Paper is released. In August 2002 the White Paper on 
National Commercial Ports Policy was released to the public and contained the 
following: 
"Section 3: National Commercial Ports Policy Statements 
1. Institutional arrangements and governance of the commercial ports system 
Transnet Limited currently owns the real estate of South African ports. The port 
authority function is delegated to the National Ports Authority, a division of Transnet. 
Services within the ports are provided by either the National Ports Authority, the Port 
Operations, another division of Transnet Limited, or private enterprise. Having a 
national port authority function as part of a transport company has resulted historically in 
the formation of several undesirable conditions that have detracted from the primary 
purpose of ports, skewing prices, misallocating port revenues and creating suspicion in 
the maritime and transport industries about the impartiality of the port entity within a 
transport company" (Department of Transport, 2002: 13). 
"There exists a legacy of fragmented private sector involvement in ports relating to land 
allocation and leasing terms. Several private terminal operators carry out commercial 
activities related to cargo traffic management and handling. Certain port users are 
captive in several monopolistic private sector terminals. 
At this stage the Port Operations Division of Transnet Limited is the major terminal 
Operator, handling nearly 100% of containerised, 80% of break-bulk and 30% of the 
bulk cargoes in the South African ports. 
The White Paper on National Transport Policy laid out a proposed policy to address 
these challenges and four fundamental port policy guidelines were recommended. 
These were briefly: 
• Establishment of the National Ports Authority; 
• Establishment of the Independent Port Regulator; 
• Separation of the port authority and port operations functions; and 
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• Promoting low cost, high IeIJel of service, and shipper choice in the port 
operations by creating a competltiIJe enIJironment In the commercial ports 
system. 
The key guiding principles underlying the new port dispensation were: 
1. The National Ports Authority within T ransnet would be positioned outside 
Transnet in accordance with Ihe restructuring programme of Transnet, as 
approIJed by the Minister of Public Enterprises: 
2 The National Ports Authority post Transnet end-state would then be established 
as a new State-owned corporate entity; 
3. The 'National Ports Authority' would be the landlord of the South African ports 
and would own all the land and the port infrastructures within the port estates; 
4 Greater priIJate sector inIJolvement in operations would be sought through leases 
and concessions: 
5 The allocation of leases or concessions would be open to compell\iIJe bidding, 
,," 
6 The bidding process would be transparent and based on a set of clearty stated 
objectlIJesftargets, criteria and measurable dellIJerables' (Department of 
Transport, 2002' 14) 
, , system so as to .",Sure an efflClent and safe 
Authority i i c( Infrastrl£ture 
. This furthe, 
aj}reements 
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neither accolmtatle to th e 
ports bJt 
NPA to ensure tha: rIO re<1t 
r OCCUfS The Port Regul""<Y is 
to e~ercise economic reQulatloo 
arJd app-oves or r NPA's 
t",-,ff, 
(The ports policy presented some winners and losers of the game. The winners were 
the Oeparlment of Public enterprises whose preference to restructure the ports is 
fulfilled by the policy (see Box F, Row 1). The loser W8S Transnet in that Its 
preference to m8lntaln its grip on the ports was squashed by the policy (see Box G, 
" 
Row 7). As mentioned earlier, Transnet has a plan and it will be evident in the efforis 
made towards the Poris Bill). 
Section 3.3.3: Concessioning Legislation: The National Ports Bill 2002-2005 
The proposed concessioning legislation experienced a lot of opposition mainly from the 
unions which acted strongly against its enactment. Furthermore, Transnet was not 
ready to loosen its grip on the ports as this move would negatively affect its balance 
sheet. Despite this opposition, the Public Enterprises Department felt the need to fast 
track concessioning to deal with congestion at the ports. The other actors involved in 
this decision point were the NPA, SAPO and the private sector. This section of the 
chapter shows the interplay among these players in their efforts to produce the National 
Ports Bill. 
Section 3.3.3.1: Hurdles for concessioning legislation emerge. By October 
2002, the NPA was generating approximately 70 per cent of Transnet's profits and 
making up a significant amount of its assets (Chalmers, 2002b: 1). However, in terms of 
the National Ports Policy, the cash cow was to become a separate state-owned though 
autonomous entity. Before moving ahead with concessions, there was need for an 
independent regulator to be established in the interim although ultimately the Port 
Authority would be regulator of the ports sector once out of Transnet. 
According to the Public Enterprises Restructuring Director, Richard Goode, the 
government was keen to ensure that the ports benefited from the funds they earned 
although it had to be mindful of the manner in which Transnet evolved. If the NPA was 
to be separated from Transnet during the time the ports policy was released, Transnet 
would fall over. According to the Transnet CEO, Mafika Mkwanazi, his understanding 
was that the NPA would separate from Transnet after 2007 with a full strategy to be 
worked out to ensure that there was no sudden shock to Transnet (Chalmers, 2002b: 
1). The separation strategy was expected to give Transnet five years to sort out its 
pension fund problems which it inherited from its predecessors as well as pay for the 
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bulk of its planned R45 billion capital expenditure drive for infrastructure renewal and 
extension (Chalmers, 2002c: 15). 
However, Jeff Radebe, the Public Enterprises Minister wanted to fast track the private 
sector involvement in Durban Container Terminal (OCT) as it was experiencing serious 
congestion problems which needed to be dealt with promptly. The two key issues which 
challenged the Transnet Board in terms of unbundling the Authority were firstly, whether 
or when the authority would be established as a separate entity or corporatized and 
secondly, how to compensate for lost profits and revenue. Being that Transnet was 
planning the R45 billion capital expenditure drive, the corporatisation of the authority 
would clearly cause problems for Transnet as its commercial lenders would be 
concerned with the separation of the cash cow from the group (Chalmers, 2002b: 1). 
In November, 2002 SATAWU's officer Jane Barrett announced that the union would 
launch anti-concession protests which would mean a socio-economic strike under the 
Labour Relations Act. This protest, she said, would only be triggered if government was 
inflexible (Forrest, 2002: 9). 
(What we learn from this section is that the Department of Public Enterprises wants to 
fast track the concessioning legislation to deal with the congestion at the port of 
Durban-to increase productivity (see Box F, Row 1). We also observe the labour 
unions still standing firmly against concessioning of the ports to safeguard their interests 
of retaining their jobs (see Box G, Row 5)). 
Section 3.3.3.2: Concession legislation underway despite opposition from 
SATAWU. As endorsed by Cabinet in April and gazetted as part of the national ports 
policy in August, concessioning was the way forward to attract private investment. 
Financed by British and United States governments, Canadian consultants were hired 
to conduct a research on all terminals at the Durban port with an eye at contracts in 
2003. According to (SATAWU Declaration On Government's Port Privatisation Plans, 
2002), Hutchinson's and P & 0 Ports (International Operators) were said to be 
interested concessionaires. 
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For SATAWU, this research was a waste of money as preliminary research had not 
been conducted locally. They also suspected that the desires of the United States and 
the United Kingdom were to promote the interests of the international terminal operators 
who were waiting on the wings to take over the Port of Durban, leaving nothing to local 
investors (SATAWU Declaration on Government's Port Privatisation Plans, 2002). 
In light of this issue, SATAWU and the Department of Public Enterprises met to discuss 
in October of 2002. The officials of the union insisted the principle of concessioning was 
not up for debate and referred this dispute to the National Economic and Labour Council 
in November. According to the unions, the decision to concession OCT was not backed 
by research and their request was for research to be undertaken and for other options 
to be tabled. 
In February 2003, Tau Morwe, CEO of SAPO, defended port restructuring following 
criticisms made by SATAWU. According to Morwe, restructuring of the ports was a 
critical catalyst to boost economic growth as well as promote investor confidence, and 
Government's plan to grant long-term management contracts for the private sector to 
run port terminals was vital as it would increase productivity, create jobs, deal with large 
infrastructure backlogs and reduce tariffs (Chalmers, 2003: 2). 
Morwe further mentioned that labour had been involved in all the discussions which 
involve the transformation of the ports and that the aim in 2003 was to have Transnet's 
port-based operations independent, able to realise business growth targets and be self-
sustainable (Chalmers, 2003: 2). 
As SATAWU and SAPO battled out the issue of concessioning, Radebe was 
announcing that invitations to tender for the concession of OCT would be issued by April 
2003. Speaking at a Parliamentary media briefing, Radebe mentioned that the 
concession model was in its final stage of development, after a long complex and 
consultative process and would be presented to Cabinet soon (Ensor, 2003: 2). This 
process took long due to the wide range of jealously guarded interests in the ports 
terrain (Ensor, 2003: 2). 
50 
(In this section we see SATAWU still standing against private participation (see Box G, 
Row 5) but is defeated by the Department of Public Enterprises which goes ahead with 
the agenda by signalling that invitations to tender would be out soon (see Box F, Row 
1). Portnet (SAPO) defends its stance for private participation to improve the operations 
at the ports (see Box F, Row 4). 
Section 3.3.3.3: The National Ports Bill is blocked. In March 2003, the draft 
ports bill debated by Parliaments Transport Committee caused a lot of friction among 
the actors of port restructuring. NPA CEO, Siyabonga Gama objected to the 
government's plans to create an independent regulator as a permanent institution. The 
bill stated that the ports authority would become an independent body outside the 
Transnet fold and would be subject to oversight by a permanent independent ports 
regulator. Gama felt that regulation should be left with the NPA after its separation from 
Transnet but agreed with the recommendation of having an interim regulator during the 
transitional phase (Chalmers and Ensor, 2003: 2). 
Another disagreement between Transnet and the NPA was over the fate of the NPA 
being under the Transnet umbrella. This dispute prompted Parliament to refer back to 
the drawing board to draft legislation that created an institutional framework to put the 
ports out to concession (Chalmers, 2003a: 11 ).The transport committee had asked the 
drafters to return with a reworked draft within the following two months as well as 
consider the relationship between the Ports Authority and Transnet, and to clarify the 
position of a proposed Regulator (Chalmers, 2003a: 11). The Committee Chairman, 
Jeremy Cronin, said the committee wanted more discussion between the Departments 
of Transport and Public Enterprises and between the NPAand Transnet (Chalmers, 
2003a: 11). 
In a letter to Parliament, Bongani Khumalo, Transnet Chairman indicated, "Transnet is 
of the view that the NPA remains part of Transnet at least in the short to medium term 
as the transfer can weaken the solvency and viability of the company, and will have a 
profound adverse effect on the economy" (Chalmers, 2003a: 11). 
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Public Enterprises Restructuring Director Richard Goode said the ports white paper 
outlined the basic institutional infrastructure, with an independent ports authority as a 
fundamental feature. However, the Authority would be removed from Transnet only 
when the group's financial circumstances allowed. According to Goode, the transactions 
required to put the ports out to concession could go ahead without the legislation in 
place, and therefore, any delay would not be critical (Chalmers, 2003a: 11). 
(Here we see Portnet (NPA) standing against reform in light of its powers being reduced 
by the Port Regulator (see Box G, Row 6). Transnet is also battling with the issue of 
NPA standing independently from it (see Box G, Row 7) as it will lose the profits being 
extracted from the ports. Will Transnet manage to win this battle? Let us see what 
happens when the Ports Bill is amended). 
Section 3.3.3.4 National Ports Bill amended. On March 2ih, 2003 the National 
Ports Bill was amended and it proposed that the NPA would be incorporated as a 
separate entity within the Transnet group. This would be the first phase and would only 
be hived off as an independent company once Transnet's finances allowed (Ensor, 
2003a: 4). 
The Authority was to house all Transnet ports, obligations and rights related to the ports 
as a corporatized entity within Transnet and according to Transnet senior business 
strategist Marius Luyt, in his address to Parliament's Public Enterprises Portfolio 
committee, the amended bill would not negatively affect Transnet as it would only be 
removed once Transnet had been restructured (Ensor, 2003a: 4). 
Unfortunately for Siyabonga Gama, NPA CEO, the bill maintained the need for the 
permanent establishment of an independent regulator. 
(This section shows us how Transnet has managed to maintain the ports within its wing 
but will this continue to be so? (See Box G, Row 7). 
Section 3.3.3.4.1: More opposition from SA TAWU. In May 2003, 
the Government requested an urgent meeting with SATAWU to discuss concessioning 
in order to avert a strike by the group (Letsoalo, 2003: 11). 
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Several SATAWU members staged demonstrations in a bid to force government into 
consultation with the unions on the restructuring process. According to SATAWU, 
government did not consult the group on the ports policy in accordance with the 
National Framework Agreement (NFA) (Letsoalo, 2003: 11). 
On May 1 ih the Minister of Public Enterprises Jeff Radebe met for three hours with key 
transport trade unions, the United Transport and Allied Trade Union, SATAWU, and the 
United Association of SA (Chalmers, 2003b: 2). The Minister reiterated the government 
policy's position on restructuring the ports which was presented to the unions in October 
2002 as well as February 2003. He further mentioned that the new ports restructuring 
committee would provide a forum for talks on the issues around the restructuring of 
operations and the committee would report back to the Minister in six weeks on the 
progress made (Chalmers, 2003b: 2). Within the six week period Radebe stated that he 
would also issue a request to private operators to submit their expressions of interest in 
the concession process. 
The trade unions assumed that they were comfortable with the outcome of the meeting 
as it was positive and that the Minister agreed that the terms of reference of the 
restructuring committee would not "preclude consideration of options other than 
concessioning as the instrument of restructuring" (Chalmers, 2003b: 2). 
(Here we see the unions and the Department of Public Enterprises bargaining to 
prevent the loss of jobs which would be affected by concessioning and we see the end 
of a strike which was disrupting productivity at the ports (see Box F, Row 1 and Box G, 
Row 5)). 
Section 3.3.3.4.2 Elements of the amended National Ports Bil/. 
On May 21, 2003 Parliaments Transport Committee was briefed by Dumisani Ntulu, 
Transport Department Manager of Maritime Regulation. The briefing was on the 
changes to the draft National Ports Bill which made provision for Transnet separating 
the NPA in a three-stage process (Ensor, 2003b: 2). 
First, the authority would become a separate division within Transnet with a 
responsibility to act as a port authority. Then it would be incorporated as a separate 
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company holding all the assets and liabilities of Transnet related to ports (Ensor, 2003b: 
2). Finally, the authority would become an entirely independent private company with its 
own share capital. The authority would be the ultimate landlord for all ports, responsible 
for their management and administration (Ensor, 2003b: 2). 
The Transport Department was concerned that Transnet could prove tardy in facilitating 
the end-state and therefore included a provision allowing Jeff Radebe to act if Transnet 
failed to do so (Ensor, 2003b: 2). 
The draft bill was silent on how long the interim state would be until independence of the 
Authority. Furthermore, the port regulator section had been beefed up substantially 
(Ensor, 2003b: 2). The bill envisaged that the Port Regulator would be an interim body 
while the NPA remained within the Transnet fold. Its task would be to regulate the 
relationship between the NPA and Transnet to ensure that the latter did not benefit 
unduly from decisions of the Authority (Ensor, 2003b: 2). The Regulator would also 
have to issue guidelines for concessioning and public/private partnerships and would be 
able to review and approve tariffs decided upon by the Authority (Ensor, 2003b: 2). 
Once it became independent the Authority could play the role of Regulator. The bill 
provided for the winding up of the Regulator though it could also continue operating 
beyond the interim phase. 
In early July, 2003, Jeremy Cronin, at Parliaments Transport Portfolio Committee 
meeting mentioned that the work on the NPA and Regulator Bill was to be completed by 
August 2003 (Ensor, 2003c: 2). 
In contrast to the white paper which proposed the mandatory end state of the Regulator, 
the bill stated that the government could decide to collapse the institution at any time it 
deemed fit. In terms of leases, Cronin stressed that the alteration or termination of 
leases would have to take place within the bounds of constitutionality and after 
negotiation (Ensor, 2003c: 2). 
(The amended Ports Bill shows Transnet back on the side lines watching as its 
principals take away its precious cash cow. In knowing that Transnet is not for the new 
Ports Bill, the Department of Transport places Public Enterprises as referee to ensure 
that Transnet does not take its time in separating itself from the ports. In this section, 
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the Department of Public Enterprises and Transport are winning but for how long will 
this last? (See Box F, Row 1 and 2). 
Section 3.3.3.5: Black Empowerment deals underway in anticipation of 
concessioning legislation. Within the same month (July 2003), international logistic 
players were getting their black empowerment ducks in a row ahead of calls for tenders 
at OCT. Jeff Radebe and Transnet CEO Mafika Mkwanazi used public forums to 
confirm their intentions to have tender documentation available in the near future 
although the legislation allowing government to privatise its assets had not been tabled 
as yet. 
In light of this, three empowerment deals were announced within the shipping world in 
July of 2003. A deal worth R2.1 billion was struck between Bidvest Group and Dinatla 
Investments consortium in which Bidvest would acquire a 15 per cent shareholding in 
the investment holding company in three years' time (Jenvey, 2003). 
Bidvest group corporate finance executive Jack Hochfeld confirmed the group would "be 
interested" in any opportunities offered in port privatisations (Jenvey, 2003). 
The shipping group Grindrod and black economic empowerment company J&J Group 
announced a warehousing and logistics joint venture, Grindrod J&J Logistics, as a 
forerunner to submitting tenders for privatisation concessions throughout Africa. 
Grindrod MD Ivan Clark said the group would "express interest" in any wharfside 
opportunities, including concessions in South Africa and Mozambique (Jenvey, 2003). 
US international port terminal and logistics group CSX World Terminals, which entered 
into a joint venture agreement with black empowerment shipping company Dudula 
Shipping in 2000, said it would open a permanent office in Durban in August of 2003. 
The group bluntly said the move was a means of securing its position in South Africa 
ahead of tendering a bid for the OCT (Jenvey, 2003). 
Dudula Shipping CEO Sithembiso Mthethwa said the joint venture would follow the OCT 
bid with others for various value-adding concessions (Jenvey, 2003). 
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The CEO of Spectrum Shipping, an independent clearing and forwarding intermediary 
and service provider to local importers and exporters, signalled its intention to seek 
acquisitions with niche market, black empowerment groups (Jenvey, 2003). Before 
departing in February he expressed that once the shareholding and management 
structure reflected the group's BEE aspirations, the group would target government 
contracts as a means of growth and expansion (Jenvey, 2003). 
Despite these moves from the private sector, SATAWU remained convinced 
government would still be open to talks on privatisation. The union demanded a public 
reassurance from Radebe that the current talks on the future of SAPO were not "a bad 
faith sham" (Jenvey, 2003). 
(In this section we see the interests of shipping companies coming into play in hopes 
for the concessioning legislation which was being solicited by the Department of Public 
Enterprises, and interestingly, Transnet. SATAWU is still against concessioning but a 
shift occurs in the next section (see Box F, Row 3 and Box G, Row 5). 
Section 3.3.3.6: Agreement between Government and labour to be 
submitted to Cabinet. In October 2003, it was announced that a report pertaining to 
the final agreement between labour and the Government on the restructuring of the 
ports was to be submitted to Cabinet shortly. Once the agreement was approved by 
Cabinet, the Government would have won labours much needed support for the 
process as it conceded that the granting of concessions may be necessary for the ports 
to be more efficient and cost effective (Enslin, 2003: 8). 
Once Cabinet approved, labour would have won guarantees that there would be no job 
losses in the three years before and after the introduction of the private sector and this 
prospect was likely to be extended to a five-year moratorium on job losses on either 
side of the deal (Enslin, 2003: 8). 
According to the trade unions, most of labours proposals were accepted and would be 
included in the final agreement although the negotiation was not easy (Enslin, 2003: 8). 
Government had yet to agree formally to a requirement of the concession contract that 
trade union-linked organisations be awarded a slice of it by the winning concessionaire 
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(Enslin, 2003: 8). Government had already ruled that 15 per cent of the OCT concession 
would be set aside for black economic empowerment (Enslin, 2003: 8), although 
finalisation of the concession would not happen soon (Ensor and Phansiwe, 2003: 1). 
The whole process of negotiating and awarding the tender was likely to stretch for at 
least 18 months (Ensor and Phansiwe, 2003: 1). 
(Here we see the bargaining and win-win situation for the labour, trade unions and the 
government. The unions would see the retention of their jobs while the government 
would be able to concession the ports without being contested by the unions (see Box 
G, Row 5)). 
Section 3.3.3.7: Ports Bill is tabled. A new ports bill was tabled in February 
2005 in which the new Public Enterprises Minister Alec Erwin was to decide when the 
NPA would be removed from Transnet, after consulting new Transport Minister Jeff 
Radebe and with the agreement of Finance Minister Trevor Manuel (Ensor, 2005: 4). 
The bill gave no definite period for the removal of the NPA from Transnet and iterated 
that all service providers in the ports were to be licensed by the Authority and would be 
subject to performance agreements (Ensor, 2005: 4). EXisting service providers - except 
the providers of stevedore services - would have six months after the act took effect to 
apply to the Authority for a license (Ensor, 2005: 4). 
Stevedoring contracts and leases for offshore cargo handling facilities would lapse only 
at the end of the contract periods (Ensor, 2005: 4). 
The bill also provided for the establishment of the Ports Regulator of between six and 
13 members. It would regulate the ports system "in line with government's strategic 
objectives" and it would monitor the NPA (Ensor, 2005: 4). 
(In this section we see the interests of Transnet's principals being accommodated for in 
the tabled Ports Bill (see Box F, Rows 1 and 2)). 
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Section 3.3.4: The National Ports Act of 2005 and its Immediate Demise. 
In August, 2005 the National Ports Act was released in the Government gazette by the 
Department of Transport but according to the NPA website, it only came into effect in 
November 2006 (TNPA, 2013). A few months thereafter, a sudden turn of events took 
place which finally led to private participation at the ports being completely removed 
from the government's agenda. 
The end result was such that the NPA remained within the Transnet umbrella without 
corporatisation. Transnet strategically integrated infrastructure ownership with 
operations revenue of the ports, railway and pipeline in order to borrow in the capital 
markets to finance long-term investments. The next sections of this chapter show how 
this came to be; the last section provides a preliminary conclusion of the outcome. 
Section 3.3.4.1: Concessioning plans are halted. In November 2005, the 
government put a hold on plans to create private concessions to run OCT. According to 
Tau Morwe (SAPO CEO) the private concessions were not on the table due to 
Transnet's strategy to integrate the ports, pipelines and rails to increase efficiency and 
productivity as well as reduce the cost of doing business (Gass, 2005: 1). 
Morwe noted that SAPO would continue running the ports until Transnet completed its 
public-private partnership model and the port operations would look for strategic 
partners in running certain businesses rather than concession them outright. 
(In this section Transnet has managed to put a hold on concessioning meaning that 
private participation will not be a threat to its ability to retain the profits it is getting from 
the ports. Furthermore, this strategy to integrate the ports is likely to continue the culture 
of cross subsidisation of profits from the ports to loss making divisions of Transnet (see 
Box G, Row 7)). 
Section 3.3.4.2: Private sector partiCipation completely removed from the 
agenda. By July, 2008 the idea of concessioning had not been heard of for some time. 
As it stood, the 2005 ports legislation envisaged that the NPA would become a separate 
company with its own bank statements (Joffe, 2008: 9). Transnet would still be sole 
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shareholder although it would no longer be able to consolidate the ports into its financial 
results. 
In early August 2008, Maria Ramos, Transnet CEO announced that Transnet had 
received assurances from government that it no longer intended to corporatize the NPA 
as such restructuring would negatively impact Transnet strategically and financially 
(Mpofu, 2008: 4). This meant that the Government intended to remain the only 
significant driver of operations and development of the ports. 
Transnet's new strategy was to integrate the rail, ports and pipeline operations and 
therefore Ramos saw no sense strategically to corporatize the ports (Joffe, 2008: 9). 
Her argument was that many companies use profits from one division to subsidise other 
companies (Joffe, 2008: 9) and that vertical separation had failed in other countries and 
therefore the global trend was to move away from it (Mpofu, 2008: 4). Dave Rennie, 
Grinrod, Freight Services CEO argued that this move closed doors for private players to 
be involved in the port sector which meant that port development remained in the hands 
of the state (Mpofu, 2008: 4). Rennie further mentioned, "Port operations could have 
benefited from more participants coming in as this would have meant more capacity and 
improved efficiencies. It would have been beneficial for increased exports and export-
led economic growth" (Mpofu, 2008: 4). 
The legislation passed in 2005 provided for a restructuring program which would 
establish NPA now (Transnet National Port Authority (hereafter TNPA)) as a company 
in the position to benefit from public-private partnerships and concessions (Mpofu, 
2008: 4). TNPA would have been responsible for development and maintenance of port 
infrastructure with the state retaining ownership while port operations would be 
outsourced to private operators through concessions. These concessions would 
produce revenue for TNPA which would be responsible for monitoring the concession 
agreements. The aim of the Government's restructuring process was to obtain higher 
efficiencies and lower costs to port users however, this rationale was superseded by 
Transnet's argument that corporatisation of the ports would strip it of its most profitable 
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assets which Transnet used to raise funds for its capital expenditure programme 
(Mpofu, 2008: 4). 
Transnet's strategy of integration among the ports and rail and its capital expenditure 
program were at a critical stage and therefore the Government made a decision that did 
not envisage corporatisation, as this would have had a negative impact on Transnet's 
balance sheet (Mpofu, 2008: 4). 
(Here we see Transnet letting loose of the decisions of its principals and pursuing its 
goal of financial autonomy see Box G, Rowl) 
Section 3.3.4.3: Transnet Wins the Battle. The end result of private 
participation at the ports was such that by 2010, Transnet had managed to push the 
consolidation of transport operations in line with what the company claimed was the 
global trend of transport sectors. 
Vuyo Kahla, Transnet's Policy and Regulation Executive addressed Parliament's Trade 
and Industry, Transport, Public Enterprises, And Economic Development Committees in 
February 2010. During his address, Kahla mentioned that the Government's policy and 
regulation for the ports, rail and pipelines incorrectly assumed that introducing 
competition to Transnet's operations was a prerequisite for an efficient freight system 
(Ensor, 2010: 1). Instead, what Transnet needed, according to Kahla, was a secure 
regulatory environment that supported its establishment as a state-owned, integrated 
freight operation of rail, pipelines and ports (Ensor, 2010: 1). 
At a briefing on infrastructure plans for Transnet, Kahla reiterated that he believed the 
Government was mistaken when it decided that separating infrastructure ownership 
from operations was optimal. He further mentioned that government was mistaken when 
it assumed that the state could own and invest in infrastructure while the private sector 
could be allowed to operate it (Ensor, 2010: 1). According to Kahla, if the corporatisation 
of NPA went ahead as envisaged in the National Ports Acts, key provisions of 
Transnet's loan agreements would have been breached and this would have reduced its 
ability to raise capital funding at optimal levels in the future (Ensor, 2010: 1). 
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Transnet was able to win the long battle of separating the ports from the Transnet 
umbrella so as to introduce the private sector. Through acting against what was to be 
law for the ports Transnet maintained its grip on the NPA as well as the port operations. 
Section 3.3.5: Preliminary Conclusion 
After establishing how institutional port reform took place in South Africa, referring back 
to the hypotheses in Chapter 1, Section 1.2, there is seemingly strong support for 
Hypothesis 1: Multiple Principals Hypothesis, than there is for the other hypotheses. As 
we have observed, the objectives of the ports sector were not aligned with the broader 
national developmental objectives and Transnet was able to win autonomy from its 
principals-successfully blocking private participation at the ports. Transnet worked in 
contradiction to the goals set by the Departments in order to pursue financial autonomy 
from Government subsidisation. 
The unions were also clearly opposed to port reform initially although there seems to be 
an agreement which was struck with Jeff Radebe to prevent job losses after the 
introduction of private participation at the ports. This will be further elaborated on, 
together with the other hypotheses in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICA'S PORT PRICING REFORM 
EXPERIENCE 
Section 4.1: The Legacy of Port Pricing in South Africa 
This chapter provides an analysis of South Africa's evolution of efforts to reform its port 
pricing system. South Africa introduced ad valorem wharfage in 1925 and these tariffs 
have shaped the transport system of the country (NEDLAC, 2008: 20). Wharfage is a 
category of general tariffs that are based on either the value of cargo or unit based 
(tons, TEU's, cubic metres) with the revenue generated by these tariffs used to pay for 
land-side equipment, infrastructure and administration (UNCTAD, 1995 cited in 
NEDLAC, 2008: 16). In South Africa, wharfage functioned as a key revenue contributor 
and central financing instrument for the rail and port system. 
The next two sections illustrate South Africa's port pricing legacy by firstly showing the 
way port prices are skewed and secondly by explaining why port pricing is this way in 
South Africa. 
Section 4.1.1: The Way in Which Port Prices Are Skewed 
In revisiting the graph from Chapter 1, Figure 1, on total waterfront charges from a 
global perspective, we can see that South Africa's Port Authority charges are: 
1) Substantially higher for cargo compared to shipping/terminal charges-illustrating 
that cargo based charges are cross subsidising ship based charges (Chapter1, 
Figure 1) and; 
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As we witnessed in Chapter 1, Figure 1 port authority charges in South Africa are very 
high and cargo dues constituted about 70 per cent of income to the port authority in 
2002 (NEDLAC, 2008: 2). 
Box H above shows categories of port tariffs in South Africa in the 1980's. The ad 
valorem wharfage of cargo-working infrastructure was providing about 55 per cent of the 
port authority's revenue, making up the bulk of Portnet revenue-and making Portnet a 
major profit contributor to Transnet. As we saw in Chapter 1 Figure 2, these profits were 
being diverted to other divisions of Transnet and its predecessors as well as to cover 
pension liabilities (NEDLAC, 2008: 21). 
Section 4.1.2: Why South Africa's Prices Are Skewed. 
i. Due to the characteristics of ad valorem wharfage during and after import 
substitution industrialisation. Ad valorem wharfage was used to reinforce tariff 
barriers and discourage high value cargo imports. It also raised the cost of exports and 
made South African ports expensive links in the logistics chain (NEDLAC, 2008: 20). 
According to (Jones, 2002 cited in Chasomeris, 2006: 107) port authorities had 
irresistible administrative advantages of raising revenue through ad valorem wharfage, 
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making it the main source of port revenue with a gross margin of 300 to 400 per cent. 
Ad valorem wharfage resulted in South African ports being profitable entities with high 
aggregate waterfront charges at world standards with low productivity levels viewed by 
the same standards. As a result, port pricing was artificially expensive for high value 
cargo and artificially cheap for vessels, on the basis of a tariff system that made sense 
for neither (Jones 2002 cited in NEDLAC, 2008: 20). 
Pricing for services within the ports and port calls should, in principal, be proportional to 
the costs of a ship making the call and this covers four principal costs namely, general 
land and marine infrastructure (not attributable to a single user), time spent in the port, 
use of a berth (attributed to a single user) and the cost of handling goods (NEDLAC, 
2008: 1). Furthermore, the price setting should be based on long run marginal costs. In 
South Africa, price setting is not based on long run marginal costs as pricing practices 
are strategic and characterised by inclusion of non-port financing objectives (Van 
Niekerk, 2002; NEDLAC, 2008; Chasomeris, 2006). 
Ad valorem wharfage had two dimensions: it was value - based rather than cost based; 
and prices were set at high levels, which grossly skewed revenues in excess of costs. 
Wharfage had no bearing on the operational activities which took place before putting 
the shipment cargo on the ship and subsequently wharfage charges had no bearing on 
operational activities prior to the placement of landed cargo on the quayside in respect 
of which landing and shipping charges were maintained (Chasomeris, 2006: 105). This 
therefore means that wharfage excluded tangible items of superstructure such as 
gantries, wharf crane or cargo handling equipment and terminals for which explicit 
charges where raised (Chasomeris, 2006: 105). 
Another characteristic of wharfage was that on an ad valorem basis it favoured low 
value export commodities as it was proportionally lower than wharfage for high- value 
commodities while using the same infrastructure and port services. As an illustrative 
example, using notional prices, let's take the value of a container of raw iron ingots as 
$10,000. Now let us assume that the same container is filled with fine machine parts, 
valued at $500,000. With a constant ad valorem wharfage, the price would be 50 times 
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the price of low value commodities; notwithstanding the effort to move these containers 
is the same for high value products. 
There was also a differential in the level of import versus export charges which reflected 
the legacy of the import substitution regime in that wharfage charges were twice the rate 
for imports than for identical exports. An example of this is when prior to the 
implementation of Value Added Tax (VAT) in 1991, ad valorem wharfage was 1.8 per 
cent on import containers and 0.9 per cent on identical export containers (NEDLAC, 
2008: 21). This discriminatory charging was against cost and equity - based pricing 
principles. Prices are not expected to be exactly equated to costs but they should be 
reasonably related. 
The import substitution regime was replaced by a manufacturing export-led economy in 
1996 but even after this, pricing at the ports remained unchanged. 
ii. South Africa's Capital and Energy Intensive Economy-liThe Mineral 
Energy Complex". Prior to 1994 there was strong support for investment in capital-
and-energy intensive enterprise though even after the inception of democracy and 
change in industrial policy, assistance is still on-going for heavy industry in South Africa 
(Black and Hasson, 2012:2). According to (Black and Hasson, 2012:2), 'traditional' 
exports have continued to expand with little diversification into non-traditional 
manufacturing exports. Their argument is that South Africa's industrial policy has been 
fairly interventionist but in the wrong direction through strengthening competitive 
advantage in resource-based, capital intensive sectors of manufacturing (Black and 
Hasson, 2012:2). 
The subsidies for the capital-energy-intensive production are on-going in South Africa 
even after the change in industrial policy due to powerful interests which have banded 
around the capital-and-energy intensive growth path of South Africa. This concept was 
named the 'mineral energy complex' (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996) and naturally these 
powerful interests opposed any reduction of this support. 
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In the case of port charges in South Africa, all imports and non-mining exports 
subsidised mining port costs. This is rooted in the history of import substitution 
industrialisation as well as the 'mineral energy complex' of the South African economy. 
For many years port charges were skewed in favour of bulk commodity exporters, with 
container traffic subsidising port investments (Smith, 2012: 5). South Africa's bulk 
commodity export tariffs are known to possibly be among the lowest in the world (Smith, 
2012: 5). 
Due to the 'mineral energy complex' there had been a historical reluctance to raise 
tariffs on bulk commodities, which for decades had been the primary export earner for 
the country-- at a time when container traffic had largely been an alternative for the 
country's imports (Smith, 2012: 5). During this time, the relatively low levels of 
manufactured goods exported from South African containers which were brought in as 
imports were sent back empty but increasingly, as South Africa industrialised and 
manufacturing shifted towards export markets, the dynamics shifted (Smith, 2012: 5). 
Tariffs on container traffic steadily increased over the years and the reluctance to 
increase tariffs on bulk commodities continued to exist (Smith, 2012: 5) until 2013 when 
a sign of change emerged. 
With this background on port pricing in South Africa, it seems quite obvious that the 
reform would be to bring prices down and part of this at the expense of Transnet's 
profits but also to bring prices down at the expense of the mining sector. Through 
process tracing as conducted in Chapter 3, the next sections show the interplay among 
stakeholders in the efforts to reform port pricing in South Africa but before we get ahead 
of ourselves, the next section gives a brief summary of what is to follow. 
Section 4.2: Restructuring Port Pricing-South Africa's Marathon 
This section is in two parts which firstly give a summary overview explaining what 
happened in the effort to reduce prices at the ports using key decisions points, followed 
by a second section which introduces the stakeholders who were involved in port pricing 
reform. 
66 
Section 4.2.1: Summary Overview of Changes in the Pricing Regime 1996 - 2013 
The abortive effort to reform prices 2002-2004. In 2001, the NPA embarked on port 
tariff reform which was expected to consist of a 4.49 per cent reduction in ad valorem 
wharfage, lowering the rate for imports from 1.78 per cent to 1.7 per cent and 0.89 per 
cent to 0.85 per cent for exports (Chasomeris, 2006). The aim of the tariff rebalancing 
was to introduce a more competitive and fair tariff system in line with international 
practice. Furthermore, the restructuring process was aimed to change past wharfage 
which was based on the value of cargo instead of volume or infrastructural costs. The 
new cargo dues system would decrease costs for value added goods-in line with the 
industrial policy of 1996. The tariff adjustments were also aimed at rebalancing the 
share of revenue contribution from marine services and infrastructure charges. 
According to (Chasomeris, 2006), costs for cargo owners were decreased although the 
costs were still value based. 
In 2002, ad valorem wharfage was replaced by cargo dues which were levied on 
tonnage (volume) basis for bulk cargo and unit basis (set box rate) for containers 
(Chasomeris, 2006). 
Stasis (with Regulatory Reform) 2005- 2008. For the period of 2005 - 2008 port tariffs 
by the NPA continued to increase in line with the inflation rate annually and exorbitant 
profits continued to be made on cargo dues to cross subsidise to other marine services, 
Transnet's divisions as well as the mining sector. In 2009 the Port regulator was 
established to determine port tariffs annually. Under the Port Regulator, tariffs continued 
to increase but at much lower rates than requested by Transnet. 
Game changer- 2012. In 2012, the President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma announced 
that Transnet and the Port Regulator agreed to a substantial decrease in port tariffs 
during the year. This decrease was to result in exporters of manufactured goods 
receiving a decrease of approximately R 1 billion in total (Zuma Details Massive 
Infrastructure Spend, 2012). 
In September of 2012, the NPA proposed a new tariff structure. The motivation behind 
the tariff proposal was to promote the programme for the export of value-added goods 
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which stressed the alignment of the tariff strLlCture with Government priorities through 
direct support to ttle key objectives of industrialisation and job creation (TNPA, 2012). 
In April of 2013. the manufacturing industry finally won the battle to reduce port costs 
The Port Regulator announced that all container export tanffs would be slashed by 43.2 
per cent, container imports by 14.3 percent and vehicle export tariffs by 21 1 per cent 
(Wilson. 2013 . 6) 
Behind all these changes in port pricing was the need to keep the NPA profits high The 
graph below shows for convenience, NPA's profits and the trends over the years 
Figure 7; NPA Profits before Tax 1996 - 2013 
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Section 4.2.1.S: Introducing the stakeholders. 
In this chapter we only have four stakeholders. The industrial and commercial port users 
are exporters of value·added goods-· players who are to gain from port reform once the 
pricing structure is changed in their favour. The Port Regulator is mandated to set prices 
at the ports in line with the Ports Act. Transnet plays the role of Regulator before the 
Port Regulator is established In its pursuit to extract rents from the ports, it increases 
port charges annually to satisfy its goals and therefore is against port pricing reform as 
this will take away its ability to set prices. The commodity exporters are exporters of raw 
mineral commodities who for many years benefited from subsidised port tariffs. Port 
pricing reform takes away these subsidies from commodity exporters and therefore we 
see this group acting against pricing reform. 
The key decision points for the port pricing reform process were: 
The abortive effort to reform prices 2002-2004. 
- Actions of the established Port Regulator 2009-2011 
- Actions by Transnet and the Port Regulator after the President's State of the 
Nation address 2011-2013 
Implementation Finally-Port Pricing aligns with the Industrial Policy. 
The table below shows the stakeholders that were involved in the pricing reform 
process, their preferences as well as the actions they took towards the effort to alter the 
structure of port pricing. 
Box I: Stakeholders for pricing reform 
Stakeholders For or Against De facto Key Actions 
Port Price Preferences for 
Reform Price Reform 
1) Industrial and For To increase profit Made demands 
commercial of transporting for reduction of 
users value-added port pricesl voiced 
goods in line with disagreement 
the national towards price 
transport policy of hikes (see 




2) Port For As mandated by Rejected all the 
Regulator the Ports Act is to proposals by 
regulate on behalf Transnet for tariff 
of the state, increases (see 
functions and Sections 4.2.3. 1, 
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at the ports. 
Box J: Stakeholders against price reform 
Stakeholders For or Against De facto Key Actions 
Port Price Preferences for 
Reform Price Reform 
3) Transnet Against To increase profits Resistedl Blocked 
from the ports for pricing reform in 
investment so far as the 









4) Commodity Against To continue being Opposed reform! 
Exporters subsidised by objected to tariff 
exports of value- increases on bulk 
added products. commodities (see 
Sections 4.2.2. 1.2, 
4.2.2.4). 
Section 4.2.2: Trends in Efforts to Alter the Structure of Port Pricing-- The 
Analytical Narrative of Port Pricing Reform in South Africa 
Using the same process in Chapter 3 this section provides an analysis of the 
stakeholders and their actions blow by blow, to reform port prices in South Africa. 
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As aforementioned, the GEAR policy was initiated in 1996 although it was not until 2013 
that port tariffs for the export of manufactured goods were lowered by over 40 per cent. 
This translates into port pricing reform taking 17 years to align with South Africa's 
industrial strategy. 
The aim of port reform was to introduce a more competitive and fair tariff system in line 
with international practice as South Africa's port charges were considered to be the 
highest in the world. Furthermore, the restructuring process was aimed to change past 
wharfage which was based on the value of cargo instead of volume or infrastructural 
costs. The mining sector had been hugely subsidised by this tariff structure which 
weighted in favour of raw exports, at the expense of the manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors for over 50 years. The new cargo dues system would decrease costs for value 
added goods which would be in line with the industrial policy of 1996. The tariffs 
adjustments were also aimed at rebalancing the share of revenue contribution from 
marine services and infrastructure charges as well as reduce the profits that were going 
to Transnet, in order to end cross-subsidisation of these profits to loss making units 
under Transnet. 
Section 4.2.2.1: The abortive effort to reform prices 2002-2004. As witnessed 
in Chapter 3, the restructuring of Portnet was necessary in order to establish a landlord 
and operations division in 2000. With restructuring came a tariff reform initiative which 
was to align the ports with international standards and deal with the high pricing. The 
tariff reform was expected to be conducted by a Port Regulator which would set prices 
at the ports. This regulator, as we will see, was only established in 2009. In the sections 
below we see Transnet setting prices annually for the ports in the name of investment 
requirements. The tariff rebalancing receive varied reactions from port users and tariff 
reform seems nowhere in sight until the Port Regulator is established in 2009. 
Section 4.2.2.1.1: Portnet to cut wharfage by 30 per cent. In 
September 1999 Portnet initiated a tariff reform initiative as part of the restructuring 
program. Speaking at a United Kingdom - South African Workshop on Ports, General 
Manager of Portnet Siyabonga Gama mentioned that Portnet was to cut wharfage rates 
by 30 per cent in the following few years as part of the restructuring process (Chalmers 
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1999b: 3). Gama further expressed that Portnet had acknowledged port wharfage rates 
were high by international standards although he believed that generally the company 
under charged for marine services by 40 to 50 per cent (Chalmers 1999b: 3). The 
decrease in wharfage, he said was likely to be offset by increases in other tariffs making 
the impact on revenue minimal (Chalmers 1999b: 3). 
What happened in 2000 was contrary to Gama's tariff reform initiative. In February 
2000, freight operators were brewing some resistance towards a draft tariff review which 
was to be implemented by April 1st of 2000. According to industry sources there was a 
hike in tariffs of approximately 7 - 8 per cent which was significantly higher than 
January's 2.6 headline inflation figure for that year (Marrs, 2000: 4). Spokesman of 
Renfreight Circle (a freight and logistics company) Sameer Wadhwa, was of the 
impression that the tariff increase would affect the price of all imports including finished 
goods and raw materials and on the export side; this hike would make South Africa's 
products less competitive in foreign markets (Marrs, 2000: 4). 
Speaking at a Maritime Africa 2000 conference, Derek Lawrence, CEO of Ladit 
Enterprises the shipping company, stressed that wharfage made South Africa's port 
costs for manufactured goods among the world's highest and that port reform was vital 
for the development of South Africa's economy (Jenvey, 2000a: 6). 
In Portnet's defence the new General Manager Pumi Sithole, mentioned that the new 
tariff increases were based on a forecasted inflation rate of 5.2 per cent although the 
company had to pursue "a differentiated tariff increase in view of various services' input 
cost structure differentials" (Marrs, 2000: 4). 
(In this section we learn the de facto preferences of industrial port users and Portnet 
(Transnet). The preference for the industrial users here is that reduced cost of shipping 
value-added products will increase their profits (see Box I, Row 1). For Portnet 
(Transnet) , its preference is to increase port prices to increase rents it receives from the 
ports (see Box J, Row 3). 
Section 4.2.2.1.2: First attempt of tariff rebalancing 2002. In 
March 2002, SAPO was to increase handling fees by 22 per cent per container starting 
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May 1, 2002 and NPA was to change its tariff structure from rating the value of cargo to 
rating a flat fee (Claasen, 2002: 18). 
These changes in port tariff structure angered the exporters of the country. Nolene 
Lossau, South Africa Shipper's Council Executive Director said that changes in the tariff 
structure would increase wharfage cost of some low- value bulk exports by 1500 per 
cent (Claasen, 2002: 18). 
In principle, he said, the council did not object to the move from value based charges to 
flat rate although the level of the charges they considered was too steep. The Managing 
Director of Maersk, Peter Ehrenreich, was also displeased with the new charges. He 
said that the charges were too high for the services being provided by the ports 
(Claasen, 2002: 18). 
According to NPA spokesman, Tegogo Moremi, the new structure for tariffs was to align 
with international practise and made them more transparent. Furthermore, he said that 
NPA wanted to address the imbalance in the tariff structure and revenue levels 
(Claasen, 2002: 18). 
The end result of the 2002 tariff restructure was such that in comparison with charges 
prior to the tariff reform exercise, after taking out cargo handling, wharfage charges 
declined only from 79 per cent to 70 per cent of revenue to NPA despite the stated 
intention of tariff reform to reduce the over recovery on wharfage and make marine 
services more reflective of actual costs (NEDLAC, 2008: 27). 
In light of the significant price increase via a once-off adjustment in 2001-2002, marine 
infrastructure charges were substantially increased in 2002 although the share that 
marine infrastructure charges make up in the port authorities basket of dues is small 
(NEDLAC, 2008: 27). The NPA continued to derive a substantial amount of its income 
from cargo dues-the former ad valorem wharfage. (In this section we see the de facto 
preference of Transnet, which is to continue extracting rents from NPA cargo dues 
(decrease of cargo dues received was only 9 per cent)(see Box J, Row 3)). We also see 
de facto preference of commodity exporters which is to continue to benefit from 
subsidised port tariffs (see Box J, Row 4). 
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Section 4.2.2.1.3: Transnet continues to increase prices of NPA 
and SAPO. In April 2004, NPA and SAPO increased their annual tariffs by 3.1 per 
cent and 6 per cent respectively (Phasiwe, 2004: 4). This move angered the shipping 
industry which was already battling against the effects of a strong rand. The shipping 
lines argued that this increase would hamper the export-led economy (Phasiwe, 2004: 
4). 
According to Tau Morwe, SAPO CEO, the hike was in line with the company's promise 
to the industry that it would go back to normal inflationary adjustments after concluding 
its tariff rebalancing of 2002. He further mentioned that the increases would enable 
SAPO to buy new equipment needed to meet service level obligations (Phasiwe, 2004: 
4). 
The CEO of NPA, Gama, also mentioned that the increase was for infrastructural 
upgrade and that the aim of the company was to develop a world class port system 
which would support South Africa's expanding economy and deliver on the demands 
from international and local customers (Phasiwe, 2004: 4). 
The Container Liners' Operators Forum Chairman Dave Rennie said the increases were 
too high and that marine services had gone up by 113 per cent in the past two years, 
making South Africa's ports extremely expensive (Phasiwe, 2004: 4). 
(In this section we see Transnet continuing to raise port prices even though the 
productivity at the ports is low, showing their preference to extract rents from the ports 
(see Box J, Row 3). The industrial port users are against this hike in prices due to its 
effect on their competitiveness. Their de facto preference is for port reform to take place 
in order to make profits for their exports (see Box, I, Row, 1) 
Section 4.2.2.2: Stasis (with Regulatory Reform) 2005- 2008 
In January, 2005 Transnet announced below-inflation port tariff increases in order to 
contribute to the lowering of the cost of doing business. According to Maria Ramos 
cargo dues paid by cargo owners would increase by 1 per cent and container handling 
tariffs by 5.7 per cent (Ensor, 2005a: 2). 
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In response to these increases, James Lennox, South African Chamber of Business 
CEO, said that the increases would have been more palatable to business if they were 
backed up by increases in productivity and port movements as port of Durban had been 
plagued by congestion (Ensor, 2005a: 2). 
Also speaking on the hike was Container Liner Operators Forum Chairman Dave 
Rennie who expressed disappointment as he said stakeholders were not consulted 
about the proposed increases (Ensor, 2005a: 2). 
In April 2007 port tariffs increased by 5.6 per cent in line with inflation forecasts (Enslin, 
2007: 16). According to the NPA CFO, Mohammed Abdool in a letter to customers, the 
tariff rebalancing would enable the company to meet service commitments, particularly 
the rollout of their infrastructure investment programme (Enslin, 2007: 16). 
Over the following five years the NPA was to spend R18. 5 billion on infrastructure 
upgrades and according to Abdool, these efforts were to reduce the costs of doing 
business through South African ports system-port users disagreed (Enslin, 2007: 16). 
The Association of Ships' Agents and Brokers of Southern Africa (Asabosa) and the 
Association of Shipping Lines both objected to the tariff increases on grounds that the 
annual increases discourage additional ship calls (Enslin, 2007: 16). For the year to 
March 2006 NPA's cargo tariffs increased by 1 per cent and in the year to March 2007 
NPA increased tariffs between 3.5 per cent and 4.5 per cent. Two years prior to 2006, 
according to reports, Transnet's tariffs increased by 16.5 per cent and 35 per cent 
respectively (Enslin, 2007: 16). In addition to NPA charges were SAPO cargo handling 
charges which in 2007, were in line with the NPA price hike. Below is the annual 
increment of cargo dues from 2003 to 2007. 
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Box K: Cargo dues annual percentage increase 2003 - 2007 
2003 200.J 2005 2006 2(}07 
Cargo dues 2.0°-0 2.0°0 1.0°0 3.5'% 4.5°0 
CPIX 6.8°'0 4.3~,0 3.6% 4.6~o 5.6°'0 
Source: (NPA tariff books for various years cited in NEDLAC, 2008: 32) 
(In this section there is no sign of tariff reform and prices at the ports continue to 
increase. Transnet is clearly still interested in the profits being made by the ports (see 
Box J, Row 3) and industrial port users are concerned with this as their profits decrease 
further (see Box I, Row 1). 
Section 4.2.2.3: Port tariffs after the establishment of the Port Regulator 
Section 4.2.2.3.1: Transnet and the new Port Regulator disagree 
on tariff rebalancing. In November 2009, Transnet and the newly established Port 
Regulator locked horns in terms of pricing at the ports. According to Transnet's 
spokesman, John Dludlu, the regulatory methodologies were in a state of flux, making it 
difficult for Transnet to optimally plan for funding solutions (Khanyile, 2009: 5). 
Beginning its operations in 2009, the Port Regulator was to determine tariffs for NPA for 
the first time. Transnet asked for 10.62 per cent average increase for 2010 and 
depending on the complexities of the submissions and NPA's response, the regulator 
hoped to have a decision on the new tariffs for the ports by January 2010 (Khanyile, 
2009: 5). 
On January 20th 2010, the Port Regulator approved the NPA 4.42 per cent tariff 
increase effective April 1, 2010. According to the regulator the 10.62 per cent increase 
was assessed but it decided that 4.42 per cent was an appropriate increase in tariffs for 
2010-11 financial year (Ports Tariffs to Increase By 4.42 Percent, 2010). 
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Speaking in Parliament in February 2010, Transnet aired its views on the current 
Regulator, stating that the tariffs were not conducive to invest in major infrastructure. 
Since Transnet for many years used its big balance sheet to pay for transport 
infrastructure and used its status as a state-owned enterprise to plan for the long term, 
the Port Regulator, among others, was no longer letting it do so (Filling in the 
Regulatory Policy Potholes, 2010: 8). 
(This section shows the mandated efforts of the Port Regulator which are to regulate 
pricing at the ports (see Box I, Row 2) and this presents a challenge for Transnet as it 
cannot set its own prices at the ports to invest elsewhere (see Box J, Row 3)). 
Section 4.2.2.3.2: Back and forth between Transnet and port 
users on tariff increases. In January, 2011 the Port Regulator approved a tariff 
increase of 4.49 per cent as opposed to the 11.91 per cent requested by NPA for 2011-
12 financial year. According to South African Shipping Council the tariff hike was too 
high a charge for cargo dues (Langeni, 2011: 2). 
The Council preferred a zero increase in tariffs due to the fact that productivity at the 
ports was low and there was still poor infrastructure at port terminals. 
Tshediso Disenyana, Senior Manager for Maritime Industry Development at the South 
African Maritime Safety Authority was also strongly against the tariff increase as he 
believed there was no justification for the increase when looking at it from the view of 
service provision at the ports (Langeni, 2011: 2). 
In August 2011, the NPA requested an 18.6 per cent increase in port tariffs for 2012-13 
(Buthelezi, 2011: 20). According to Transnet's Sigonyela, this request was based on the 
need for the investments and costs of managing the ports system (Buthelezi, 2011: 20). 
Senior economist at Econometrix, Tony Twine, was of the impression that exporters 
were concerned about port inefficiencies which were already adding to port charges and 
the port authority's request came at a time when its reputation was already tarnished 
(Buthelezi, 2011: 20). 
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In response to this, Sigonyela said that the application was guided by best practice in 
economic regulation for tariff determination and based on the interpretation of the ports 
directives under the National Ports Act (Buthelezi, 2011: 20). 
The Chief Executive of the South Africa Association of Ship Owners, Thato Tsautse, 
said they were taken aback by the 18.6 per cent increase request as it looked 
unrealistic in the light of the economic climate (Buthelezi, 2011: 20). He said the tariff 
increase would place unnecessary pressure on the economy especially due to 
inefficiency within the supply chain. 
Manager for Economic Intelligence and Finance at the Agriculture Business Chamber, 
Ms Lindie Stroebel, a/so expressed frustration in the tariff hike. She said that Transnet's 
behaviour, being an SOE was strange as the enterprise was profit-driven and its cargo 
dues were about to increase drastically at a time when the fragile local economy was 
highly dependent on state support. She further mentioned that there seemed to be a 
lack of understanding that the cost of doing business in South Africa needed to 
decrease so that exporting industries could increase market share (Radebe, 2011: 2). 
In Transnet's defence, Sigonyela responded by mentioning that over the last five years, 
the Authority had invested R13.2 billion and planned to invest an additional R23.2 billion 
in the following five years on expanding and maintaining South Africa's port 
infrastructure hence the proposed increases (Buthelezi, 2011: 20). 
(This section shows Transnet's de facto preference to extract rents from the ports for 
investment (see Box J, Row, 3). The port users' preferences here are to have pricing 
that reflects productivity (see Box /, Row, 1). 
Section 4.2.2.3.3: Study on Port Terminals by the Port 
Regulator. The NPA and Port Regulator commissioned a study involving all major port 
terminals globally in 2011 (Buthelezi, 2011a: 15). This was in order to establish whether 
the claims that South Africa's ports are among the most expensive were true. 
According to Tau Morwe, NPA Chief Executive, action would be taken to align prices 
with the global average if evidence showed that the tariffs were too high. Furthermore, 
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Morwe mentioned that NPA was working on restructuring its pricing model as part of its 
long term goals (Buthelezi, 2011 a: 15). 
In October, 2011 Transnet's Mboniso Sigonyela announced that it was developing a 
new pricing strategy for the ports and that this strategy would be implemented by March 
2011. The 18.06 per cent Transnet applied for according to Sigonyela was based on 
allowing Transnet to recover its investment on owning, administering and controlling 
ports and its investment in port facilities (Donnelly, 2011). 
(In this section we see the Port Regulator ensuring that it administers the right pricing by 
conducting a study (see Box I, Row 2). Transnet is also seen to maintain its stance on 
extracting more rents from the ports (see Box J, Row 3)). 
Section 4.2.2.3.4: Transnet Exposed. Within the month of October, 2011, 
the Cape Chamber of Commerce sent a letter to the Port Regulator quoting a Wiki 
Leaks cable in which Transnet admitted to seeing the ports as its "cash cow" and using 
the profits from the ports to subsidise its loss making operations (Business blasts 
Transnet plan, 2011). 
The letter further showed evidence that port tariffs had been artificially increased to 
serve as a tax on imports and the Chamber argued that Transnet had used every trick 
in the book to justify tariffs that were hundreds of per cent higher than those levied at 
leading ports in the developing world (Business blasts Transnet plan, 2011). 
The Wiki Leaks cable from US diplomatic staff in South Africa to Washington which was 
released August 24, 2011 also reported proceedings of a meeting which took place in 
Cape Town in March 2008 attended by officials of SAPO (now Transnet Port Terminals 
(TPT)), NPA (now (Transnet National Port Authority (TNPA)) and the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial. Research as well as the maritime industry. 
It quoted a comment by the Council's Emma Maspero saying "Transnet's financial 
situation provides a disincentive for the South African Government to fully implement 
the changes recommended in the National Ports Authority Bill" (Business blasts 
Transnet plan, 2011). 
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Billy Cilliers, the Ports Authority's Manager for Planning and Port Development 
concurred that the NPA was the cash cow for Transnet and its transfer to an 
independent authority would entail a difficult transition for Transnet. He further noted 
that no other country had a port authority or operator structured similarly to South 
Africa's (Business blasts Transnet plan, 2011). 
In the chamber's letter, Michael Bagraim, its President, said: "Port tariffs for container 
imports and exports are already more than double the average of a selection of 12 ports 
in various parts of the world, according to Mihalis Chasomeris in his benchmarking 
study, Port Pricing in South Africa" (Business blasts Transnet plan, 2011). 
"Tariffs in Durban [and other South African ports] were roughly three times as high as 
tariffs in Rotterdam, four times the tariffs in New York and five or six times the tariffs for 
the port of Antwerp" (Business blasts Transnet plan, 2011). According to the Chamber, 
there was a clear case for a phased reduction in charges to bring them in line with those 
of most ports in other countries (Business blasts Transnet plan, 2011). 
Transnet in December 2011 held discussions in Port Elizabeth with automotive sector 
customers where it pronounced a plan to work with its customers to establish a tariff 
structure that would yield a mutual benefit for all parties. The group further insisted that 
it did not want to endanger its balance sheet (Buthelezi, 2011a: 15). 
According to Transnet Chief Executive Brian Molefe, it made sense for Transnet to fund 
its capital expenditure from fees rather than relying on borrowing. Nevertheless, Molefe 
assured customers that the company's profit would be reinvested into the infrastructure 
to facilitate the movement of products (Buthelezi, 2011a: 15). 
(In this section we clearly see the preference of Transnet which is to retain the ports 
within its group in order to extract profits. On the other hand, there seems to be a tum of 
events. All of a sudden, Transnet is planning on changing the tariff system to benefit all 
parties-not just the commodity exporters (see Box J, Row, 3). 
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Section 4.2.2.4: President's State of the Nation Address-Game changer. 
In February, 2012, President Jacob Zuma announced Government's massive 
infrastructure plan in his State of the Nation address. Within his speech, he said that the 
Government had been looking to reduce port charges as part of reducing the costs of 
doing business in South Africa (Zuma Details Massive Infrastructure Spend, 2012). 
"The issue of high port charges was one of those raised sharply by the automotive 
sector in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage during my performance monitoring visit to the 
sector last year," he said (Zuma Details Massive Infrastructure Spend, 2012). 
"In this regard, I am pleased to announce that the Port Regulator and Transnet have 
agreed to an arrangement which will result in exporters of manufactured goods, 
receiving a significant decrease in port charges, during the coming year, equal to about 
R1 billion in total" (Zuma Details Massive Infrastructure Spend, 2012). 
The shipping companies welcomed a tariff increase of 2.76 per cent approved by the 
Port Regulator for 2012 to 2013 financial year (West, 2012: 2). According to the Port 
Regulator, 2.76 per cent was reasonable after considering various submissions from 
stakeholders. South African Association of Ship Owners CEO Thato Tsautse and 
Mediterranean Shipping Company CEO Captain Salvatore Sarno were among the 
shipping companies that expressed their gratitude about the low tariff increase (West, 
2012: 2). 
Tau Morwe, TNPA chief executive, speaking at the Western Cape Exporters Forum in 
April 2012 said that the initial idea was for the rebate to last until Transnet came up with 
a new pricing strategy for port tariffs (Buthelezi, 2012: 17). 
"But if it can have a positive effect on job creation, it won't be a once-off," Morwe said 
(Buthelezi, 2012: 17). 
However, Molefe of Transnet did not mention whether bulk exporters would face larger 
tariff increases than they had in the past (Buthelezi, 2012: 17). Dick Kruger, an 
economic adviser to the Chamber of Mines, in response to this, said that the chamber 
would oppose any unilateral increases in tariffs for raw exports as bulk commodities still 
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remain strategic to the country and form a massive part of gross domestic product 
(Buthelezi, 2012: 17). 
(From this section we see a huge change in South Africa's port price saga. The 
exporters of value-added products finally see the reversal of the earlier cross-
subsidisation regime after over 50 years (see Box I, Row 1). We also see opposition 
from exporters of raw materials (see Box J, Row 4)). 
Section 4.2.2.4.1: TNPA Proposal for a New Tariff Structure 
September 2012. 10 In September 2012 TNPA conducted a study and proposed a 
new tariff structure for the ports. The tariffs structure used at the time was developed as 
part of the price rebalancing of 2002 and had not been updated since (TNPA, 2012). 
The TNPA acknowledged that the tariff structure presented several issues and 
embarked on a redesign exercise. Two key issues related to the tariff structure were 
summarised in the tariff proposal as follows: 
1. "Lack of explanation for differential tariffs for different commodities using the 
same handling classification; 
2. Lack of information detail with respect to services or facilities pricing and cost 
relationships, which made it impossible to determine where and in which 
direction subsidisation took place or if it did not" (TNPA, 2012). 
Furthermore, the real estate business of TNPA was excluded from the tariff structure, 
which therefore did not encompass the entire business of TNPA. As a result of these 
issues, the tariff structure presented several imbalances in the determination of the 
various tariffs, including: 
1. "Very high tariff levels for cargo dues resulting from the migration from the old 
wharfage charge, which was calculated on an ad-valorem basis depending on 
the value of the cargo; 
IOThe information in this section was extracted from Transnet National Port Authority Proposal for New Tariff 
Structure 2012. 
82 
2. Very high differentials in the levels of cargo dues for different cargo types and 
commodities with no clear motivation for the differences; 
3. Relatively low tariff levels for maritime services, which are based on an activity-
based costing exercise conducted during the tariff rebalancing of 2002 and that 
has since not been updated, resulting in the subsidisation of some services; 
4. Very low levels of revenue from the real estate business as compared to other 
landlord port authorities across the world" (TNPA, 2012). 
The new proposed tariff structure aimed at addressing these imbalances through 
providing a robust methodology, which was based on a clear set of principles, to 
determine the optimal levels for the various tariffs. The motivation behind the tariff 
proposal also included the proposed promotion programme for export of value-added 
goods which stressed the alignment of the tariff structure with Government priorities 
through direct support to the key objectives of industrialisation and job creation (TNPA, 
2012). 
In October of 2012, TNPA asked for 5.4 per cent average increase in port tariff 
application for 2013-14 financial year (Hutson, 2012). This request was considered 
surprising in that the year before the company had asked for 18.6 per cent. 
Another surprise was that TNPA in its application, asked for a reduced tariff of 43.21 per 
cent on all export containers and 14.33 per cent decrease on imported boxes (Hutson, 
2012). If granted, this would surely benefit cargo owners more especially in the 
agricultural sector making containers used for export commodities such as fruit and 
wine being one of the big winners (Hutson, 2012). Another winner would be the 
manufacturing sector as would be the motor industry where the TNPA had applied for a 
15.71 per cent reduction on motor vehicle exports (Hutson, 2012). 
According to TNPA, unlike other international ports, it has to recover its capital 
investments on administering, operating and owning the ports while also being required 
to make a profit commensurate with the risk of owning and operating such a business. 
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Many ports elsewhere in the world are capital funded by the state or municipal budgets 
(Hutson, 2012). 
Aside from port tariffs, cargo owners have to bear costs of terminal tariffs which do not 
come before a port or the regulator-an anomaly of the Ports Act. These tariffs are 
applied by TNPA or private port terminal operators without the consent of the Port 
Regulator or the Minister of Transport (Hutson, 2012). 
The Ports Regulator called for comments on the proposed port tariffs and held a series 
of meetings to which port users and interest parties were invited. In November, the 
Eastern Cape motor industry which is a major user of the ports for vehicle exports 
rushed to submit a response on how badly a port tariff hike would affect the company 
(Hayward, 2012: 7). 
According to Tau Morwe CEO of Transnet when speaking to Parliament's Trade and 
Industry Committee, the new port pricing system would see cargo dues significantly 
reduced but it would also see terminal operators and other port tenants pay rentals 
nearly double what they were paying at the time (Hayward, 2012: 7). The new rate was 
based on a user-pay system, which charged businesses non-subsidised rates for 
upgraded facilities (Hayward, 2012: 7). 
(This section shows us an interesting twist to the port tariff request by Transnet. What 
we see here is a likely significant reduction of cargo dues for industrial users (see Box I, 
Row 1) but at the same time, Transnet asks for a 5.4 per cent average increase at the 
ports (see Box J, Row 3). The next section shows the outcome of the 2013 port tariff 
rebalancing) . 
Section 4.2.2.5: Implementation Finally-Port Pricing aligns with the Industrial 
Policy 
By March, 2013 the Ports Regulator was to announce the new tariffs structure which 
was to include the reduction of more than 40 per cent in the tariff on exported containers 
(Azzakani, 2013). This was part of the TNPA strategy to reduce South Africa's port 
charges which were among the highest in the world. The announcement was made 
during a colloquium on the impact of administered prices on the manufacturing sector. 
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In addition to the new tariffs the NPA was to propose a reworking of its tariff structure 
which would see higher charges for bulk commodities of up to 68 per cent (Azzakani, 
2013). South African port tariffs were at least 8.7 times more than the global average for 
containers and 7.4 times the global average for automotive cargo (Azzakani, 2013). The 
Department of Trade and Industry Director-General, Mr Lionel October, welcomed the 
expected tariff reduction, and said that it would be a major boost for exporters 
(Azzakani, 2013). He believed the advantages would be extended to agriculture and 
agro-processing (Azzakani, 2013). 
Gert Schoeman, spokesman of Kumba Iron Ore which transports its ore from Sishen to 
Saldanha, opposed the tariff changes and stated that the company had a long-term 
agreement with Transnet governing the export of iron ore. This agreement according to 
Schoeman determines the tariffs they pay and provides a mechanism for adapting these 
annually; therefore, the tariff changes would have to be discussed in the context of this 
agreement (Pressly, 2013: 17). 
Molefe expected the mining sector to object to the plans of hiking tariffs on dry bulk 
cargo by more than two thirds and in his defence mentioned that the sector had been 
hugely subsidised by a tariff structure which favoured the sector at the expense of 
agricultural produce and manufactured goods (Pressly, 2013: 17). 
Defence Alliance (DA) trade spokesman, Geordin Hill-Lewis mentioned that there was a 
danger that the hike on raw commodities would "kill the goose that lays the golden 
eggs" although Molefe suggested that these hikes would only be phased in by 2019 
(Pressly, 2013: 17). 
Rob Davies, Trade and Industry Minister said that his department had been concerned 
about the structure of export tariffs which had been a disadvantage to manufactured 
exports. He further mentioned that what was being proposed was a move in the right 
direction and supported a tariff structure that did not cross-subsidise primary products' 
export through higher charges on value added goods (Pressly, 2013: 17). 
In April of 2013, the manufacturing industry finally won the battle to reduce port costs. 
The Port Regulator announced that all container export tariffs would be slashed by 43.2 
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per cent, container imports by 14.3 per cent and vehicle export tariffs by 21.1 per cent 
(Wilson, 2013: 6). 
Molefe said that the shift in tariffs was part of the Government's economic policy and 
National Development Plan and highlighted that the TNPA overall port tariff revenue 
would not be hindered as adjustments in other sectors would make up for the price cut 
(Wilson, 2013: 6). 
After 17 years port tariffs had finally aligned with the Government's trade policy which 
stressed the need for an export-led industrialisation. 
Section 4.2.3: Interim Conclusion 
In this chapter we have witnessed the efforts to reform port pricing in South Africa. The 
chapter has revealed much more explicitly into the picture we had before, both in terms 
of the role of the mines as well as the issues of complexity in pricing as seen in 
Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 6 from Chapter 1, Section 1.2. In line with H4, we have 
observed in this Chapter that the pricing at the ports was not understood by the players. 
If this were otherwise, the industrial users would have insisted that pricing reform took 
place much earlier. Instead, they simply asked for lesser tariff increases than proposed 
by Transnet. Therefore, strong evidence is provided here that complexity of the pricing 
added to the difficulty of pricing reform. This Chapter also offers strong support for H6 in 
terms of the mines. Evidently, the mines were opposed to tariff reform as this process 
took away the subsidies they enjoyed for over 50 years. Further elaboration on this and 
all the other hypotheses is provided next, in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The port reform process in South Africa has been very slow. This is evidenced by the 
slow process of establishing the white paper in 2002, ports act in 2005 and pricing 
reform in 2013 when the change in industrial policy took place in 1996. Chapters 3 and 
4 introduced us to the stakeholders involved in the port reform efforts and the roles each 
played in the restructuring process. Through 'deduction and induction' this chapter 
revisits the hypotheses from Chapter 1, Section 1.2 and tease out the implications of 
each in the light of the two chapters. 
The Hypotheses 
GROUP 1: Multiple Principals Hypothesis 
H1: Multiple principals as well as capture by strong SOE (Transnet) leveraging 
allies blocked reform. 
GROUP 2: Technocratic Hypotheses 
H2: Private participation and price rebalancing is bad policy. 
H3: Failure to reform is as a result of poor management. 
H4: Complexity and non-transparency of the pre-existing pricing and cross-
subsidisation regime added to the difficulty of reform efforts. 
GROUP 3: High-level Politics Hypotheses 
H5: Labour unions have veto within the ANC alliance and therefore opposed private 
participation and successfully blocked reform. 
H6: Economic actors were resistant to productivity focused restructuring (Mineral 
Energy Complex and the unions) and have veto power. 
Analysing these hypotheses one by one, it is seemingly clear from the way port reform 
played out in South Africa that we can unequivocally reject H2: Private participation and 
price rebalancing is bad policy; on the basis that Colombia and Argentina successfully 
introduced private participation and price rebalancing to their ports. We can also reject 
H3: Failure to reform is as a result of poor management; on the basis that at a high-
level, the Departments of Transport and Public Enterprises were very clear in detailing 
what needed to be done to restructure the ports and these Departments pushed hard 
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and consistently for reform to be achieved. It is on this basis that we can therefore reject 
H3. 
In analysing H1: Multiple principals as well as capture by strong SOE (Transnet) 
leveraging allies blocked reform; Chapters 3 and 4 show strong evidence which 
supports this hypothesis as these chapters illustrate how Transnet repeatedly and 
successfully managed to block port reform in South Africa. As seen in Chapter 3, 
Transnet was cleared of its pension debt in 2000, offering it an opportunity to proceed 
with port reform; yet the enterprise preferred to act in contradiction to the efforts of its 
principals throughout the reform process. Further analysis of the governance structure 
of Transnet would give us a deeper understanding of the specifics in terms of the 
alignment of multiple principals of Transnet which have different objectives from one 
another; but such analysis goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
H5: Labour unions have veto within the ANC alliance and therefore opposed private 
participation and successfully blocked reform; presents some elements of truth as 
evidenced in the process tracing exercise of Chapters 3 and 4. The chapters reveal that 
labour unions do have veto power and opposed private participation in the ports 
although in 2003, the unions made an agreement with the Public Enterprises Minister 
which signalled that the Government could go ahead with concessioning the ports 
without contestation from the unions. This hypothesis is supported in both chapters as it 
has some elements of truth but is mixed in terms of the agreement made between the 
unions and the Minister. 
H6: Economic actors were resistant to productivity focused restructuring (,Mineral 
Energy Complex' and the unions) and have veto power; is supported in Chapters 3 and 
4 as we learnt from process tracing that the unions were against reform although they 
seemed to have been bought off by the Public Enterprises Department. Given the 
losses, the mines were surely "opposed" to reform as is evident in the process tracing. 
As we observed in Chapter 4, the mines' argument was that raw bulk commodity 
exports continue to form a massive part of gross domestic product and increasing tariffs 
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on these commodities would "kill the goose that lays the golden eggs". Furthermore, 
these exporters enjoyed subsidised tariffs for over 50 years, and as evidenced, were 
reluctant to reform pricing although, there is no way of telling how decisive they were in 
relation to the unions just by analysing their opposition. 
It is clear that Transnet, labour and the mines were all opposed to reform but the 
evidence strongly suggest that each of them individually, may not have been able to 
block port reform. After going through all the hypotheses, we have unequivocally 
rejected H2 and H3. As for H1, there is strong evidence that Transnet is an SOE that is 
repeatedly acting in contradiction to the signals from its formal principals Departments 
of Public Enterprises and Transport. This concept of an SOE having multiple principals 
is argued by (Aharoni, 1982 cited in Levy, 1986: 77) as below: 
"The notion that the government or the minister is the principal and that 
the enterprise is the agent is misleading .... The state is not a person, 
not even a single organisation. It acts through a variety of ministers, 
legislators and civil servants who are themselves agents of the general 
public. These different agents invariably see their mission as different from 
one another. Their goals are rarely, if ever, stated explicitly and trade-offs 
among them are not agreed. Thus different agents give the enterprise 
conflicting parallel commands ... ' 
In considering H5 and H6, we have introduced other stakeholders of reform; labour and 
the mines (,Mineral Energy Complex'), and we have learnt from the process tracing that 
they both opposed port reform. H4: Complexity and non-transparency of the pre-
existing pricing and cross-subsidisation regime added to the difficulty of reform efforts is 
supported by the process tracing in Chapter 4. The narrative does not provide us with 
any sign that the industrial port users understood the port pricing system. Instead of 
requesting lesser increases on proposed tariff increments by Transnet, they certainly 
should have expressed the need for a port pricing overhaul because clearly the pricing 
system at the ports was astonishingly flawed. The startlingly misdirected quality of the 
criticism and debate appears to suggest that the basic dilemma was not understood by 
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the players due to the complexity of pricing and cross-subsidisation. Therefore, this 
hypothesis provides a contributing feature to the reason why port reform played out this 
way in South Africa. 
In conclusion, the process tracing suggests that H1 is the dominant hypothesis and the 
dominant explanation has to do with the unequivocal evidence of Transnet working as a 
powerful autonomy seeking public enterprise in pursuit of stronger financial 
performance. However, a complete story needs to pay attention to the influence of high 
level politics presented in H5 and H6 as well as the issue of complexity as addressed in 
H4. Analysis of these high-level politics goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Transnet's goal to maximise rents for stronger financial performance was to cross 
subside to loss making divisions of the transport enterprise. To understand why these 
losses existed in the first place would require an analysis of Transnet's debt stemming 
from its predecessors. Again, this goes beyond the scope of the present dissertation. 
Notwithstanding the 17 year veto's, in 2013, there appears finally to be a decisive 
reversal. In looking this through, paraphrasing from Martin Luther King one might want 
to believe that the ark of policy reform is slow, but bends towards social gains. Although, 
looking at the narrative from 1996 to 2012, there is no evidence of hope. However, 2013 
suggests that perhaps and for reasons that are beyond this dissertation in the long run 
that may not be true. 
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